DISINFORMATION

According to Danish state authorities, there were no major foreign influence campaigns to speak of in the lead-up to Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election. Local fact-checkers and journalists tracked pro-Russian narratives and fringe propaganda channels, but nothing resembling a broad, coordinated campaign with significant reach emerged. Monitoring and analysis by Defense Innovation Highway and OpenMinds of part of the Danish online information environment during the ca

Dating apps promise connection, chemistry, and maybe even love. For Ukrainian and Russian intelligence services, they also offer something else: data, emotional vulnerability, and a private channel to manipulate targets. When Russia launched its full-scale illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the front lines extended beyond the physical battlefield into the digital space. Among many other sites, dating platforms such as Tinder and its local equivalents became operati

The Kremlin’s intention to control its digital environment is not new. Even Russians’ most widely used messaging app, Telegram, was not spared from it. However, a failed 2018 effort to block the app exposed the limits of direct restriction. Despite regulatory pressure, the platform continued to operate, creating a ‘grey zone’ where even pro-government voices could express limited forms of dissent. In 2026, this phase appears to be ending. Besides blocking external platforms,