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Russia’s information war against Ukraine’s European future is a threat to Europe itself
Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is not only a political process. It is a strategic security choice for Ukraine and for Europe. That is why Russia is attacking it not only with missiles, but also with manipulation, fear, and distrust. A joint report by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD), Beyond the Battlefield: Russia’s Information War Against Ukraine’s European Future, shows that Russia’s attempts to underm
24 hours ago


Explosives and propaganda: Russia’s dual-use drones
Russian First Person View (FPV) drones have become a defining feature of the war in Ukraine. The same drones used to drop explosives on civilians and military targets are also being used to distribute propaganda leaflets in frontline communities, combining physical violence with psychological warfare. A video report from Kherson. The combination of violence and persuasion may seem contradictory, but studies of coercive control offer an explanation. The Russian tactics in Kher
3 days ago


How Moscow tries to cover up its failures on the Ukrainian battlefield
Since launching its illegal invasion against Ukraine, Russia has developed a category of narratives aimed at covering the war according to its preferences. However, Russia’s Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaign has recently abandoned even the slightest pretence of credibility. While the Ukrainian military is regaining a tactical military advantage and Russian successes on the battlefield are dwindling, Moscow’s disinformation machine is trying to
Jul 1


Yandex: From tech innovation to information control
Yandex is one of Russia’s leading technology companies. Just like Google, for more than twenty years it has served as the gateway to the internet, as well as a source of knowledge about the world and current events, for many users in Russia and abroad, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The problem is that the Russian state has long manipulated the information Yandex users receive in their searches, shaping a distorted picture of reality. Those who buy an
Jun 24


The dog that didn’t bark: What the Danish election reveals about Russian influence operations
According to Danish state authorities, there were no major foreign influence campaigns to speak of in the lead-up to Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election. Local fact-checkers and journalists tracked pro-Russian narratives and fringe propaganda channels, but nothing resembling a broad, coordinated campaign with significant reach emerged. Monitoring and analysis by Defense Innovation Highway and OpenMinds of part of the Danish online information environment during the ca
Jun 4


Tough love: Spies, dating apps and the dark side of online intimacy
Dating apps promise connection, chemistry, and maybe even love. For Ukrainian and Russian intelligence services, they also offer something else: data, emotional vulnerability, and a private channel to manipulate targets. When Russia launched its full-scale illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the front lines extended beyond the physical battlefield into the digital space. Among many other sites, dating platforms such as Tinder and its local equivalents became operati
Jun 2


Propaganda as a weapon system: how Russian propaganda shapes soldiers’ beliefs and combat motivation
One of the features that makes propaganda effective is that it reshapes how people understand the world around them, turning war into ‘peace’ and lies into ‘truth’. Propaganda, disinformation, and information manipulation more generally do not work like an order from a commander which makes a person take up arms; its influence is more gradual and more insidious. The non-governmental group LingvaLexa, with the support of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the
May 7


Pranked by the Kremlin: fake phone calls as a FIMI instrument
Vladimir Kuznetsov, known as Vovan, and Alexei Stolyarov, who goes by Lexus, are known for pranking world leaders and celebrities. They have called many of them using fake aliases, often posing as Russian, Ukrainian, or Western politicians, publishing carefully selected excerpts on their social media accounts. Framed as comedy, their work is highly political, consistently reinforcing narratives favourable to Moscow. A shift after Crimea: targeting Ukraine and its allies Their
Apr 22


Secession for you, prison in Russia: Moscow’s selective love for self-determination
From Texas to Alberta to Catalonia, the Kremlin amplifies separatist causes abroad while jailing those who voice similar ideas inside Russia. The Kremlin routinely accuses other countries of instigating “colour revolutions” and backing separatist movements. Given the Kremlin’s well-documented flair for projection , it comes as little surprise that Moscow engages in exactly the kind of behaviour it denounces by backing separatist movements in Western countries, both openly and
Apr 7


The FIMI of Russian Invincibility: How a Myth Becomes a Strategic Weapon
The mythology of Russian military invincibility is not new, but since the full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 it has become one of the central pillars of the Kremlin’s information warfare. Research shows this narrative is deliberately engineered to serve geopolitical, military and psychological objectives; in particular to deter Western support for Ukraine, demoralise Ukrainian society, and project an image abroad of unstoppable Russian power . The invincibility myth depic
Mar 4


When defeat becomes disinformation
Throughout 2025, Russian officials were repeatedly shut out of the governing bodies of international organisations – a direct consequence of Kremlin’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and its escalating campaign of hybrid interference worldwide. A glimpse of what’s to come? 2025 was a bad year for Russia’s international standing. As Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently described on Facebook, Ukraine and its allies worked hard throughout
Mar 2


What the Kremlin wants you to believe about its war against Ukraine
Five recurring false narratives the Kremlin uses to justify and distort its war against Ukraine. Russia has carried out online disinformation and FIMI campaigns against Europe and Ukraine for over a decade. After the illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, these activities grew rapidly in scale and intensity. The Kremlin now uses information manipulation as a key tool in its confrontation with the West. Alongside the war in Ukraine, Russia is also waging a
Feb 27


As New START ends, disinformation about it continues
The Kremlin blames others for not extending The New START Treaty. But Moscow played a big role in undermining the Treaty long before its demise. On 6 February 2026, The New START Treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty, expired . As that happened, the Kremlin both launched and continued FIMI campaigns that sought to minimise Moscow’s responsibility for the Treaty’s lapse, blame the expiration on outside actors, generate doomsday paranoia, and proclaim a new nuc
Feb 19


FIMI and disinformation as global threats
A number of recent global risk assessments converged on a clear message: FIMI, disinformation, and misinformation have become a systemic threat for democracies worldwide. This is no longer simply an issue of ‘fake news’ but a structural risk that undermines the conditions for economic growth, social welfare, and liberal institutions. Another clear message emerging from these reports is the importance of a robust public‑interest media ecosystem as a guardrail against informati
Feb 10


Beyond the block: How adaptable Russian FIMI and Telegram’s gaps evade EU sanctions
In December 2024, Telegram began restricting access to channels of Russian propaganda resources sanctioned in the EU. However, a study by the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law revealed a wide range of tools used to bypass the ban. The persistence of Russian information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in the EU stems from two key factors. First, it is the inherent adaptability of Russian threat actors post-sanctions. Second, it is Telegram’s own platform gaps that con
Feb 6


Lavrov’s 2026 presser: a three-hour FIMI offensive against Europe and its leaders
Lavrov’s 2026 presser: a three-hour FIMI offensive against Europe and its leaders Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s annual press conference(opens in a new tab) on 20 January 2026 was not a diplomatic review, but a carefully orchestrated example of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) directed at Europe, the EU, the Baltic states, Moldova, and key European leaders. Over nearly three hours, Lavrov repeated a familiar set of Kremlin narratives intend
Feb 4


Seeing the whole picture: a new way to track Russian FIMI
Russian disinformation campaigns are not random but organised, persistent, and designed to manipulate how people think, vote, and trust institutions. Despite years of research and monitoring, responses to these operations remain fragmented. The lack of coordinated reporting and a shared framework leads to duplication of efforts and limits the impact of counter-FIMI measures. That is why EU DisinfoLab, together with its partners the European External Action Service (EEAS), Vig
Jan 21


In 2026, the Russian economy is in big trouble
In 2026, the Russian economy is not yet in decline, but it is in real trouble. War-driven growth is losing momentum, sanctions are tightening, financial reserves are shrinking, and uncertainty is increasingly shaping everyday life. What for a while looked like resilience is proving fragile, as the economic costs of the war spread beyond the battlefield. The illusion of resilience For years, the Kremlin has insisted that Western sanctions do not work and that Russia’s economy
Jan 19


TikTok: A Unique Marketing Tool or a Sticky Threat to Security and Mental Health?
Over the years, TikTok has risen to become a global entertainment and information ecosystem, with a monthly user base reaching nearly 1.6 billion people. Propastop analyzed whether the platform—which claims to have around 400,000 users in Estonia (a figure provided by TikTok that cannot be independently verified)—is truly “a place where every company and politician must be, because that’s where the consumer and voter are,” or if it poses a potential threat to society’s psycho
Jan 8


We are still dealing with the long tail of decades of Russian narrative-building and disinformation campaigns
EUvsDisinfo i nterview with Keir Giles . Keir Giles is a British writer, an expert on the Russian military and Russian disinformation. He has written and commented on the geopolitical conflict between the West and Russia such as NATO’s Handbook of Russian Information Warfare published through NATO Defense College. In his last book: Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent, Giles lays out the stark choices facing leaders and societies as they conf
Jan 6
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