2025 in review: winning the narrative
- Res Publica

- 3 hours ago
- 4 min read

At the end of 2025, a clear pattern stands out in Russian disinformation: the persistent construction of an image of strength in the face of growing constraints. Throughout the year, Kremlin-aligned outlets amplified exaggerated or false claims of military success in Ukraine, presenting marginal advances as decisive victories. As discussions about future negotiations gained prominence, this narrative of invincibility served a specific purpose – to shape perceptions, set the terms of debate, and compensate in the information space for weaknesses on the battlefield and in the economy.
2025 retrospective on EUvsDisinfo
The outgoing year will be remembered for key analytical frameworks of the European External Action Service: the ‘iceberg’ and the ‘galaxy’ of disinformation, which capture both the visible outputs and the vast hidden infrastructures behind FIMI operations. Against this backdrop, the European Union took an important step forward with the presentation of the Democracy Shield, an instrument to counter foreign information manipulation, with expectations of further reinforcement by 2026.
Over the past twelve months, we have systematically analysed and exposed Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations. In Moldova, we identified coordinated disinformation attempts that ultimately failed to influence the electoral outcome, while Ukraine and Georgia were under constant information pressure. These operations were not confined to Europe alone: Russian influence activities were also documented across other regions, including Africa. In parallel, we revealed the emergence of a full-fledged disinformation-for-hire industry, demonstrating how influence operations are increasingly outsourced, professionalised, and scaled. This trend has been further amplified by the rise of artificial intelligence, which Russian actors have exploited through large language model grooming.
At the same time, as Russia’s economy shows increasing signs of strain, the Kremlin has intensified its reliance on hybrid warfare, combining divisive interference aimed at fragmenting the European Union with more direct and provocative actions, including penetrations of European airspace. Together, these developments highlight a strategic shift toward ever more aggressive and integrated forms of pressure as conventional resources diminish.
Exaggerated Russian victories in Ukraine
One particular narrative of Russian disinformation in the past year has been dedicated to building an armour of perceived invincibility – a narrative grounded in Russian historical revisionism. Indeed, the Kremlin’s present-day textbooks are full of belligerent justifications and wartime glorification. One of our series of articles explored how such glorification campaigns are built around the so-called ‘Victory Day’ on 9 May. Yet, the image of an undefeated giant goes far beyond one day in a year. Two years ago, the Institute of Mass Information detected a significant spike in Russian disinformation stressing Ukraine’s alleged ongoing defeat while describing Russian victories.
In fact, after the beginning of the so-called three-day ‘special military operation’, Russian forces were forced to retreat from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kherson oblasts. Since then, they have failed to achieve superiority in Ukrainian airspace and lost full control over the Black Sea. They even temporarily lost Russian territories in the Kursk region before they resorted to accepting help from North Korea. While it is true that Russian forces have made some advances, these territorial gains have come at an extremely high cost in personnel and equipment losses, and they are often exaggerated. After almost four years of full-scale aggression, the only regional capital Russian forces have captured was Kherson, and it was liberated eight months later.
Russian FIMI in 2025
Throughout 2025, Russian official communications and state-aligned media repeatedly framed the war as a story of progress and success. Even minimal or ambiguous battlefield developments were presented as decisive victories. The capture of small villages, partial control of contested areas, or advances measured in hundreds of metres were announced as major breakthroughs that allegedly changed the strategic balance of the war. Russians deployed their ‘mapaganda’ not only to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty but also to overstate their territorial gains.
Notably, the offensive on Pokrovsk has been systematically accompanied by Kremlin-aligned messages about steady advances and the upcoming fall of the city as early as mid-2024. On 1 December 2025, the Russian Defence Ministry claimed the capture of Pokrovsk. However, as of 20 December, the independent assessment of the Institute for the Study of War proves that the city has not been fully occupied. Similarly, the Russians recently claimed control over Kupyansk only to be debunked by President Zelenskyy himself, who visited the city to make a video.
Smokescreen for negotiations
Besides morale-boosting, Russian fictional triumphs and the inflation of the Kremlin’s own success serves another goal – to prepare the ground for future political steps, and more specifically, a stronger position at the negotiating table. Following a FIMI campaign ahead of the Alaska summit, the Kremlin has continued to forge a narrative of invincibility as potential negotiations are high on the agenda. Meanwhile, the Russian federal budget for 2026 was reported to include cuts in defence spending while increasing financing for televised propaganda. Such budgetary reallocations might suggest a strategic shift from reinforcing efforts on the battlefield to more favourably shaping the information space for a diplomatic offensive.
The database of EUvsDisinfo tracks such disinformation cases and contains fact-based responses to each of them. For instance, an image of a weakened Ukraine pressured to negotiate by its European allies is one Russian narrative of 2025. Another narrative portrays Putin as a merciful leader willing to negotiate with a defeated Ukraine despite its defecting army. Don’t be deceived.
Article and pictures first time published on the EUvsDisinfo web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.





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