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A Rebirth in Flame: Ukraine’s Beleaguered Energy System

  • Writer: Res Publica
    Res Publica
  • 1 hour ago
  • 5 min read

Russia’s relentless assault on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and a crisis of governance promise a cold winter. But there is hope ahead.

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Illustrative photo. Elimination of the Consequences of Hostile Shelling of Poltava Region / Photo – Ministry of Energy of Ukraine/Zmist


The Kremlin’s forces have been striking Ukraine’s energy generation and distribution facilities almost daily. Attacks on November 25 alone left more than 40,000 people without power in the Kyiv region, 20,000 in Odesa, 13,000 in Chernihiv, 21,000 in Dnipro, and more than 8,000 in Kharkiv.  


Emergency shutdowns were imposed in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Sumy regions, and hourly scheduled outages and industrial load restrictions are in effect across the country. Residents in the capital say it’s now common to have just three hours of power in the morning and three in the afternoon. The disruptions underline how deeply Russia’s energy war has eroded Ukraine’s resilience as winter is setting in. 


This is a vulnerability with long historical roots. For decades, Ukraine’s energy architecture was tightly connected to Russia’s, a legacy of the Soviet integrated grid and a result of dependence on Russian nuclear fuel, spare parts, and gas.  


Before the full-scale invasion of 2022, Ukraine’s electricity system was synchronized with Russia and Belarus. In 2021, the last full year before the all-out war, Ukraine reached 158.4bn kWh of electricity production — a 5.2% increase on the previous year — with nuclear power providing 54.4% of all generation and thermal plants 23.5%. Renewables, combined heat and power, and hydropower accounted for the rest.  


Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe, was a central pillar of the system. 


By the time Russia began attacking Ukraine’s grid in 2022, Kyiv was already working to reduce dependence on its untrustworthy and aggressive neighbor. In 2015, during the war in Donbas, Moscow’s forces had shelled the Luhansk thermal power plant in Shchastia, foreshadowing the Kremlin’s later campaign of systematic destruction.  


Ukraine diversified away from Russian nuclear fuel, becoming the first state in the world to fully eliminate dependence on Rosatom for VVER-type reactors. It also halted direct gas imports from Russia in 2015 and started reforming its electricity markets and regulatory institutions.  


This gradual decoupling accelerated dramatically after the full-scale invasion. Ukraine immediately disconnected from the Russian and Belarusian energy system and, just weeks later, joined the European ENTSO-E grid — a milestone originally planned for 2023. This shift fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of European energy security. 


Russia responded with an increasingly destructive strategy. During the first year of the full-scale war, most strikes focused on substations and distribution nodes, until Moscow shifted to attacks on generation with strikes on thermal power plants, hydropower dams, and renewable installations.  


In 2024 alone, Ukraine lost about 9 GW of generating capacity to missile and drone attacks, equivalent to one-third of pre-war consumption. All of Ukraine’s 15 thermal power plants have been damaged or destroyed, and their share in the energy mix has collapsed to around 5% from 23.5% before 2022.  


Up to 80% of combined heat and power plants have been hit, while hydropower has suffered devastating losses, including the destruction of the Kakhovka plant and major damage at Dnipro. Other renewable energy infrastructure has also come under repeated attack, particularly in frontline regions.  

With the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant offline since its occupation by Russian forces in 2022, these losses have compounded a deficit of both baseload and flexible generation just as winter demand is rising. Moscow has a clear strategy to attempt to freeze Ukrainians into submission. 


As the physical attacks on the system intensified, internal governance failures further undermined resilience. Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) exposed a corruption network inside Energoatom, the state nuclear operator, where intermediaries systematically imposed 10–15% kickbacks on suppliers in exchange for uninterrupted payments and access to contracts.   


According to NABU, individuals with no formal position in the company or the ministry exerted effective control over procurement, staffing, and financial flows. These revelations pointed to a shadow governance structure manipulating decision-making in an enterprise with annual revenues exceeding 200bn UAH ($4.7bn).  


The political fallout has been swift: the Ukrainian parliament dismissed both Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and his successor, Svitlana Hrynchuk, in rapid succession. The dual dismissal underscored the depth of the crisis and the urgency of regaining control over a sector that is both strategically vital and highly vulnerable. 


Ukraine is now working to stabilize the sector through leadership changes, stronger governance, and deeper cooperation with international partners. New US appointments to Energoatom’s supervisory board reflect a commitment to clean up the company after the corruption scandal and pave the way for development, including plans to expand the use of Westinghouse’s AP1000 pressurized water reactors and commission small modular reactors.  


But the more immediate problems are immense as Ukraine enters the critical winter period with a shortage of maneuverable generation, heavy reliance on inflexible nuclear units, crippled hydropower facilities, and damaged gas infrastructure.  


Without substantial Western support — particularly air defense systems, transformers, and financial assistance for emergency repairs — blackouts are likely to be more regular, people will suffer in the cold, and economic activity may slow. 


Yet Ukraine retains strategic advantages that could shape a path forward. Its integration with ENTSO-E is irreversible, making Russia’s influence over European energy security more limited than at any point in the last 30 years, and continued expansion of cross-border links with Poland, Slovakia, and Romania could position Ukraine as a regional exporter once stability is restored.  


Corporate governance reforms, reinforced by US participation in Energoatom, create a framework to protect state enterprises from political interference. And the deepening partnerships with Washington and Brussels place Ukraine firmly within the Euro-Atlantic energy architecture. 


Ukraine’s energy system sits at the intersection of war, reform, and geopolitical realignment. Russian strikes will continue to degrade infrastructure, but the country’s long-term direction is clear: a move toward Western standards of governance, closer integration with the US and Europe, and the transformation of its energy sector from a fragile wartime system into a future regional hub.  


The challenge for this winter is to endure. And the challenge for the coming decade is to modernize, corporatize, and integrate — ensuring Ukraine emerges from the war not only as a survivor but as a strategic energy actor in the Euro-Atlantic community. 

By Kateryna Odarchenko. Kateryna Odarchenko is a political consultant, a partner of the SIC Group Ukraine, and president of the PolitA Institute for Democracy and Development. A specialist practicing in the field of political communication and projects, she has practical experience in the implementation of all-Ukrainian political campaigns and party-building projects.  Article and pictures first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.


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