How Russian Weakness in the South Caucasus Can Reward the West

Developments in 2025 have highlighted the reordering of regional power relations in the South Caucasus. There is opportunity for the West, but peril too.

Fuzuli international airport, called the air gate of Karabakh / Source report.az

Tensions over an Azerbaijan civilian airliner destroyed by a Russian missile, the cautious rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey, and Georgia’s increasingly confrontational stance toward the European Union (EU) reflect tectonic changes in the South Caucasus. 

They follow major shifts in external influence over recent years, even as new energy and transport corridors intensify linkages across the Caspian, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions. Political developments in the South Caucasus nations of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have also altered the three countries’ relations with their external partners.  

Taken together, these changes have direct implications for the interests of the US and the EU in terms of political influence, peace and stability, as well as the future of economic cooperation. It would be easy for the West to get this wrong; a clear focus is critical. 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the escalation of conflicts over the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (heavily aided by Russia), and Nagorno-Karabakh (taken by pro-Armenian forces in 1994), the geopolitical alignment of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia remained essentially stable from the 1990s through the 2010s.  

While Georgia pursued close relations with the US and EU, Armenia remained dependent on its security and economic ties with Moscow. Azerbaijan, for its part, prioritized its relationship with Turkey, which provided diplomatic and military support for Baku’s claims on Nagorno-Karabakh. 

The 2020 Karabakh War and the 2023 expulsion of ethnic Armenians from that region marked a key turning point. Regaining control over Karabakh and its surrounding areas facilitated Azerbaijan’s pivot from a conflict-centered foreign policy stance to an ambitious strategy geared toward amplifying its status in the region and beyond.  

Baku has since strengthened cooperation with China, Central Asia, and the EU, in particular over the expansion of the Middle Corridor linking Asia and Europe. Azerbaijan has also sought to capitalize on Russia’s decreased influence in the South Caucasus, as a result of the war in Ukraine, by occasionally challenging Moscow’s role in the region while retaining pragmatic ties with the Kremlin. 

Attitudes toward Russia have hardened in Armenia, largely due to the perception that Moscow failed to adequately support Yerevan and Karabakh Armenians. While the Armenian economy remains heavily reliant on Russia as a source of energy and a market for goods and labor, Yerevan is trying to reduce its political and security dependence on Moscow by normalizing relations with Turkey and through a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. 

Authorities in Georgia, on the other hand, are gradually veering away from the country’s longstanding pro-Western orientation and have provided an opening for improved relations with Russia.  

As Tbilisi’s crackdown on pro-democracy protesters continues to damage its prospects for closer alignment with Euro-Atlantic institutions (its EU membership hopes are now frozen), Georgia has also looked to strengthen ties with China. The 2024 decision to award the Anaklia deep-sea port project to a Chinese consortium, for instance, underscores Beijing’s growing influence in the region, including the Black Sea coast. 

These regional shifts carry important implications for the US and EU. Opportunities for engagement have opened up, for example, through Armenia reorienting its foreign policy away from Moscow-led formats such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and toward European integration, and Azerbaijan seeking to position itself as a regional hub connecting East and West.  

The US is already attempting to capitalize on this opening through its proposal to manage a transit route connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, via President Donald Trump’s “Route for International Peace and Prosperity” or TRIPP. 

Yet these developments do not mean Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has vanished. The Kremlin continues to exercise considerable leverage through energy supply chains and entrenched links with security and political elites.  

And if Western engagement focuses primarily on infrastructure deals or security access, it risks eroding the normative foundation underpinning Western soft power in the region.  

As the regional countries seek more autonomy in their foreign policies, Western influence can no longer be taken for granted. Sustaining it will require credibility, consistency, and attention to values.  

And if the West fails, the dangers are clear. The combination of a weakened Russia and a values-light Western approach could produce a security vacuum in a vital region that is marked by internal volatility and proximity to conflict flashpoints in the Middle East and the Black Sea. 

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By Marion Foster. Marion Foster is a policy researcher interested in the intersection of international relations, foreign policy analysis, and historical inquiry. Article first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.