In Russia’s FIMI laboratory: test case, Moldova

Last year’s combination of a presidential election and an EU referendum offered Russia an opportunity it could not afford to ignore, as we examined here and here. Russia certainly did not restrain itself when it came to funding or other resources. In the 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats, we took a closer look at the role of FIMI as part of a much wider influence campaign targeting Moldova in 2024.

Leading up to the election, Russia increased the intensity of its FIMI operations against Moldova. Combining existing infrastructure with newly developed assets, Russia tried to undermine the EU enlargement process and weaken support for President Maia Sandu.

Adding new ingredients

We highlight four main ingredients from the Russian FIMI cocktail. Unlike on previous occasions when Russia seemed to care about the deniability of its actions, this time the Kremlin decided to be much more transparent, combining both covert and overt channels. Consequently, Russian official channels got more directly involved in targeting Moldova and took on a more aggressive role. Russia redeployed FIMI infrastructure previously used against Ukraine to provide more information manipulation firepower to attack Moldova. Finally, to create the impression of credibility on the ground and to ensure wider content distribution, a network of new local channels was created.

Moldovan iceberg

As we uncovered in another article drawing lessons learned from the 3rd Report, the Russian FIMI ecosystem consists of both overt channels which can be easily attributed to the Kremlin and covert ones which operate under state oversight and are systematically aligned with its actions.

On the official side, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its spokesperson Maria Zakharova in particular have been doing their utmost to set the stage and plant the first disinformation seeds. Russian state-controlled channels like the wire service TASS, the Eurasia Daily, and their local satellites like Sputnik Moldova were among the key content creators. Telegram channels affiliated with these outlets ensured the first stage of amplification.

Shedding light on FIMI life in obscure waters

Plunging deeper into the cold and obscure waters around the FIMI iceberg, we see a wide ecosystem of Telegram channels reposting and sharing content. They also get notably more active in key moments on election weekends. We recognised three interesting species in this particular ecosystem.

Firstly, channels with well-known connections to Russia that were previously focussed on Ukraine and the South Caucasus, such as the Telegram channel Ukraina_ru, redirected their attention to target Moldova. These outlets even repurposed some of the narratives traditionally associated with Ukraine, such as allegations of organ trafficking, and redirected them to target Moldovan President Maia Sandu.

Flood the information space

Besides the redirection of focus from Ukraine to Moldova, two types of endemic networks emerged. The local branch of Portal Kombat played an active role in amplifying content from Russian-operated sources on Moldova’s elections and the EU referendum by using automated translations as well as the automated copying and pasting of content.

Expanding beyond its initial centre around the pravda-en.com channel, new Moldova-focussed domains targeted both Russian and Romanian-speaking audiences. The role of moldova-news.com, moldova.news-pravda.com, md.news-pravda.com, and pravda-md.com was to flood the information space with content from Sputnik Moldova’s Telegram channel, a key node of the network.

As if amplifying content from Sputnik Moldova was not enough, another channel – Moldova24 – emerged. This network of at least 14 websites functioned as a full-fledged media outlet with a live broadcast and TV studio. Its role was to generate original content with local resonance.

However, the IP address linked to this network was associated with multiple RT (Russia Today)-affiliated websites, showing potential ties to Russian state-controlled outlets. Eventually, access to moldova2.online, the main website in the group, was blocked by Moldova’s Information and Security Service (SIS).

No news on the narratives front

The narratives that these outlets spread, however, were less original. Apart from repurposing existing narratives about Ukraine and wider anti-Western templates to target Moldova, these outlets also recycled the usual disinformation tropes. The main messages these channels were peddling included, inter alia, (1) portraying the EU as a threat to Moldova’s economic and political sovereignty, (2) framing EU integration as provoking a confrontation with Russia or (3) being a threat to Russian-speaking communities, and (4) fuelling tensions with the Transnistrian region.

A combi cocktail

Russia’s election interference attempts relied on a combination of manipulative tactics, including AI-generated content, the falsification of documents, and information suppression. Meanwhile, false fact-checking was used to create further confusion. Russia partially succeeded in weaponising poverty among segments of the Moldovan population with a Telegram chatbot it created that offered payment for distributing anti-EU content.

To be continued… learn and adapt

Russia has shown the ability to learn and to adapt its approach. The Kremlin has capitalised on its long-term efforts by constantly building networks that Moscow can mobilise and boost for pivotal events like elections.

When engaged during elections and other high-stakes moments, this strategy also contributes to boosting long-term interference in countries that Russia has in its geopolitical sights.

The FIMI infrastructure in Moldova was not only fully used in 2024. It was also tested and strengthened to be deployed in the future – for instance, in the lead-up to important parliamentary elections this autumn in Moldova.

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Article and pictures first time published on the EUvsDisinfo web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.