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Before taking a deeper dive into the 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats , let’s first look at the pro-Kremlin narratives observed over the past week. Pro-Kremlin FIMI activity focused on distorting both security developments and Europe’s economic outlook. One example was the false claim that the rocket targeting a joint US-UK military base located on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia was launched from a submarine in a false flag attack by the US . Unsubstantiated false fla

This article reflects key arguments from a debate hosted by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on 16 January 2026 Ukraine is central to European history One of the most persistent distortions in discussions about Russia’s war against Ukraine is the assumption that Ukraine is historically marginal, an “edge case” recently pulled into European affairs. This assumption is not only wrong; it actively reproduces a Kremlin-centred view of history. Ukraine has been a core s

Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the outbreak of hostilities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, residents of Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories (TOT) have faced a steadily tightening system of information control. This process accelerated dramatically after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Today, an estimated 5 to 6 million people living under occupation exist in a prolonged state of information limbo. They are cut off from Ukrain

Imagine a world where your past is not yours – where every event, every hero, every town can be deleted and replaced with someone else’s script. For Ukraine, this has not been speculative fiction but but a political practice it continues to resist. Centuries of Ukrainian history have been rewritten by Russia, which corrupts the files, reformats archives, so that they conform to its imperial design. In late 2025, Vladimir Putin signed Decree No. 858 , a technical document outl

Some young people resist Kremlin pressure to create a generation of Putin-supporting nationalists. The West must recognize and support them. Russian anti-war activist Maxim Lypkan / Source: memopzk.org “Wars are not won by generals, but by schoolteachers,” Vladimir Putin said in 2023, in a statement that has become a cornerstone of his approach to youth indoctrination. The regime is determined to reshape young Russians’ minds by replacing critical thinking with militarized pa

The mythology of Russian military invincibility is not new, but since the full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 it has become one of the central pillars of the Kremlin’s information warfare. Research shows this narrative is deliberately engineered to serve geopolitical, military and psychological objectives; in particular to deter Western support for Ukraine, demoralise Ukrainian society, and project an image abroad of unstoppable Russian power . The invincibility myth depic

Five recurring false narratives the Kremlin uses to justify and distort its war against Ukraine. Russia has carried out online disinformation and FIMI campaigns against Europe and Ukraine for over a decade. After the illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, these activities grew rapidly in scale and intensity. The Kremlin now uses information manipulation as a key tool in its confrontation with the West. Alongside the war in Ukraine, Russia is also waging a

The Kremlin blames others for not extending The New START Treaty. But Moscow played a big role in undermining the Treaty long before its demise. On 6 February 2026, The New START Treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty, expired . As that happened, the Kremlin both launched and continued FIMI campaigns that sought to minimise Moscow’s responsibility for the Treaty’s lapse, blame the expiration on outside actors, generate doomsday paranoia, and proclaim a new nuc

For decades, television was considered the primary mouthpiece of propaganda. The digital age, however, has elevated a new and potentially more dangerous instrument of influence: video games. Under the guise of entertainment, they shape worldviews and political narratives, making propaganda subtle, scalable, and effective. Unlike passive media, video games offer players not only a story but an experience in which they actively participate. As a result, ideological messages emb

A number of recent global risk assessments converged on a clear message: FIMI, disinformation, and misinformation have become a systemic threat for democracies worldwide. This is no longer simply an issue of ‘fake news’ but a structural risk that undermines the conditions for economic growth, social welfare, and liberal institutions. Another clear message emerging from these reports is the importance of a robust public‑interest media ecosystem as a guardrail against informati

In December 2024, Telegram began restricting access to channels of Russian propaganda resources sanctioned in the EU. However, a study by the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law revealed a wide range of tools used to bypass the ban. The persistence of Russian information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in the EU stems from two key factors. First, it is the inherent adaptability of Russian threat actors post-sanctions. Second, it is Telegram’s own platform gaps that con

Lavrov’s 2026 presser: a three-hour FIMI offensive against Europe and its leaders Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s annual press conference(opens in a new tab) on 20 January 2026 was not a diplomatic review, but a carefully orchestrated example of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) directed at Europe, the EU, the Baltic states, Moldova, and key European leaders. Over nearly three hours, Lavrov repeated a familiar set of Kremlin narratives intend

Russia’s foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations are diverse, entrenched, well-resourced, and coordinated. They are also linked globally to culture through ‘Cultural Heritage Exploitation’, or CHX. CHX is a multi-institutional endeavour with spatial, temporal, cognitive, and material aspects. In practice, it fuses pro-Russian historical propaganda to cultural objects, and it is one of the tools deployed to legitimise Russia’s war against Ukraine a

Russian disinformation campaigns are not random but organised, persistent, and designed to manipulate how people think, vote, and trust institutions. Despite years of research and monitoring, responses to these operations remain fragmented. The lack of coordinated reporting and a shared framework leads to duplication of efforts and limits the impact of counter-FIMI measures. That is why EU DisinfoLab, together with its partners the European External Action Service (EEAS), Vig

EUvsDisinfo i nterview with Keir Giles . Keir Giles is a British writer, an expert on the Russian military and Russian disinformation. He has written and commented on the geopolitical conflict between the West and Russia such as NATO’s Handbook of Russian Information Warfare published through NATO Defense College. In his last book: Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent, Giles lays out the stark choices facing leaders and societies as they conf

The European Union has adopted a new round of sanctions aimed at countering Russia’s ongoing hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and malicious cyber activity targeting the EU, its member states and partner countries. The latest decision lists twelve individuals and two entities involved in coordinated disinformation campaigns, propaganda networks and cyber operations linked to Russian state interests. The listings form part of

At the end of 2025, a clear pattern stands out in Russian disinformation: the persistent construction of an image of strength in the face of growing constraints. Throughout the year, Kremlin-aligned outlets amplified exaggerated or false claims of military success in Ukraine, presenting marginal advances as decisive victories. As discussions about future negotiations gained prominence, this narrative of invincibility served a specific purpose – to shape perceptions, set the t

On 19 December 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin once again appeared on his annual televised call-in programme , ‘Direct Line with Vladimir Putin’, answering questions submitted by members of the public. Putin’s speeches and public appearances are a major pillar of Russia’s Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns. By framing disinformation narratives at the highest level, Putin’s public proclamations provide legitimacy and talking points that s

2025 was certainly a bad year to be flying in or out of Lithuania. According to the Ministry of the Interior , 320 flights have been disrupted at Vilnius and Kaunas airports because of cigarette-smuggling air balloons crossing from Belarus, causing sixty hours of closures and affecting 47,000 passengers. But the fallout has been even harsher for around 185 Lithuanian lorries stranded in Belarus over Christmas, after the authorities there barred them from returning home. Alth

The emergence of a global, large-scale disinformation industry has privatised influence operations, granting states strategic reach with plausible deniability. A quiet revolution has taken place in the world of propaganda. Operations that used to be run by authoritarian governments and intelligence agencies are now outsourced to private firms that sell disinformation and deception as a service. From fake social-media armies to AI-driven smear campaigns , disinformation and F