Exposing and analysing Russia’s FIMI operations

On March 19, the EU HRVP Kaja Kallas presented the 3rd EEAS Report(opens in a new tab) on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats. As we summarised on our initial analysis of the report, focuses on how to expose FIMI operations and builds on the 1st Report on how to analyse FIMI and the 2nd Report on how to respond to in a comprehensive manner.

With this series of articles, we took a deep dive into the 3rd Report, to show you how state actors develop an ‘iceberg’ of influence and manipulation networks, some operating openly while others staying in the shadows. We also explored the ‘galaxy’ of FIMI incidents and entities to see how information manipulation operations are interconnected. To facilitate a common understating of the FIMI threat, we provided a glossary of useful terms. Finally, we zoomed in on two case studies of Russian FIMI operations, one in Africa and another in Moldova. Let’s recap what we’ve learned.

A glossary: who is who in the FIMI zoo?

Navigating the professional terminology and jargon of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) can sometimes be confusing, so we have prepared a handy glossary of key terms and concepts for the FIMI galaxy. Read more.

The architecture of Russia’s FIMI operations

Russia’s disinformation campaigns are not a loose collection of random lies; they are the product of a carefully engineered system. We took a look at the architecture behind the Kremlin’s information manipulation and interference operations, exposing the four blocks of FIMI architecture – official state channels, state-controlled outlets, state-linked channels and state-aligned channels. Read more.

Enter the galaxy: a network analysis of influence operations

Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations rely on a vast, interconnected network – the FIMI galaxy. It is comprised of both overt and covert chancels across multiple platforms to spread, recycle, cross-promote and hide the true origins of manipulative content. Read more.

In Russia’s FIMI laboratory: test case, Moldova

Moldova has been used as a testing and development ground for Russian FIMI operations for a long time. We take a look at some of the more distinct features of these experiments from last year’s campaign. Read more.

Echoes of influence: inside Russia’s FIMI activities in Africa

Russia’s FIMI operations in Africa are not fleeting campaigns but an embedded, adaptive and persistent feature of the information environment. Russia aims to reshape public perception, undermine Western influence, and advance its own long-term, geopolitical objectives on the continent. Read more.

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Article and pictures first time published on the EUvsDisinfo web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.