Kazakhstan and the Russian Tightrope

President Tokayev has restored order since “Bloody January” and boosted Kazakhstan’s image, but Russia’s economic weakness and tougher US sanctions could cause big problems.

Source: Tass

In January 2022, Kazakhstan teetered on the brink of state collapse. Nationwide protests, ignited by a spike in liquified petroleum gas prices, quickly escalated as violent opportunists seemed to attempt a coup against President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. In response, the president invoked the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to bring in Russian and other foreign troops and also issued a shoot-to-kill order. The events of “Bloody January” resulted in 238 fatalities.

Tokayev has since curtailed the influence and careers of key followers and relatives of Nursultan Nazarbayev, his disgraced predecessor, and introduced cosmetic political reforms, restricted civil liberties and political rights, and courted foreign investment. Fashioning a reputation as a skillful autocrat, he has refrained from antagonizing Russia as the Kremlin wages its war of aggression in Ukraine.

Tokayev heralds Kazakhstan as a “middle power,” a claim bolstered by the government’s recent efforts to increase container shipments via the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Kazakhstan seeks to capitalize on global interest in rare earth minerals by courting investors; its economy appears robust, and the 2025 Astana International Forum was recently hailed a success.

But Kazakhstan has become more economically integrated with Moscow since 2022, and its prospects are overshadowed by the potential for stagflation in Russia’s economy. The possibility of more stringent US sanctions, or the proposed European Union measures outlined on June 10, on Russian banks and energy, including high tariffs or sanctions on those dealing with restricted entities or resources, would hurt Astana.

Tokayev aspires to project an image of success for Kazakhstan, both at home and abroad. To sharpen its diplomatic, informational, economic, and financial instruments, he is overseeing efforts to attract foreign investment, accelerate advancements in science and technology, accentuate his country’s global status, and enhance its critical infrastructure. He has also called for reform of the United Nations Security Council, in the interest of greater inclusivity. 

But Kazakhstan’s own democratization does not feature in his developmental model. While advocating for a “listening state,” Tokayev shows no wish to liberalize the political system, and this neglect could inflame domestic politics, causing state-society relations to spiral out of control in the way they did in 2022. 

He should prioritize economic diversification, alongside institutionalizing and dispersing political power, to augment the Kazakh government’s legitimacy. But there is no sign he will, and his autocracy will remain at-risk as long as Russia continues its illegal war in Ukraine.

Astana’s tight entwining with Moscow makes it highly susceptible to future economic hardship, and Kazakhstan would benefit from adopting measures to “balance” its relationship with Russia to buttress its sovereignty.

If the Kremlin’s war strategy remains shaped by hubris, high expenditure, indifference towards its forces, targeting Ukrainian civilians, and refusing to agree to a ceasefire with Kyiv, then the specter of intensified sanctions could greatly harm Kazakhstan’s economic prospects and endanger its political equilibrium.

If more stringent sanctions against Russia go into effect, the ramifications for Kazakhstan are likely to be two-pronged: the deterioration of its economy and an increased gravitational pull from Moscow. Instead of merely calling for a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-Ukraine War, Tokayev should seek to leverage Kazakhstan’s alleged “middle power” status to try to persuade the Kremlin to agree to a genuine ceasefire.

Tokayev has demonstrated competence since 2022, which he employs to legitimize his brand of authoritarian rule, but additional Western sanctions, followed by increased Kremlin influence, would undermine his credibility. Tokayev needs to move more decisively as his balancing act grows increasingly precarious.

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By Charles Sullivan. Charles Sullivan specializes in Central Asia and is the author of Leaders of the Nation: Kazakhstan during the Twilight of the Nazarbayev Era and the Russo-Ukrainian War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2025). Article first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.