The Cossack identity has become an increasingly potent symbol for both Russia and Ukraine, and responses to the festival of Pokrova show neither is going to give it up.
In mid-October, the All-Russian Cossack society congratulated its members on the holy festival of Pokrova, a religious holiday central to the identity of Ukraine’s Cossacks.
It served as a reminder that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not solely about kinetic warfare, but also about ideas. The October 14 holiday, which is symbolized by the veiling of an icon of the Virgin Mary, celebrates the Mother of God — the Most Holy Theotokos — protecting people during a siege of Constantinople.
In Russia it assumes national significance, for “on this day back in 1641 the Cossacks won a victory over the Turks near Azov,” the Cossack Society said, overlaying historical meaning with religious sanctification.
Perhaps because of the frequency of their other celebratory activities — scarcely a week goes by without some local Cossack festival somewhere in Russia — the significance of the holiday has gone relatively unremarked.
On the other side of the frontline, the Ukrainian Cossacks celebrate Pokrova (“Protection” in Ukrainian), and entwine it with national symbolism. October 14 was declared the Day of the Ukrainian Cossacks in 1999, the day for commemorating the founding of the (anti-Soviet) UPA in World War II, and, in 2015, the Day of the Defenders of Ukraine.
As Ukraine declares itself “the Cossack nation,” celebrating this Cossack holy day is of integral significance to Ukrainian national identity. While separate celebrations of the festival and its meaning have been held in Russia and Ukraine since at least 2019, this seems to be the first year the Russian Cossacks have included Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhian Cossacks in their narrative, claiming a role for them in the 17th century defense of Azov. Zaporizhzhia oblast is an integral element of the modern Ukrainian state, large parts of which are currently occupied by Russian invading forces.
While this extension of Russian Cossack history is explained by the creation of the new Russia-aligned Zaporizhzhia Cossack host in occupied Ukraine, it is also a blatant and overtly imperial attempt to weave a new historical cloth and create a new narrative of the war.
Just as converts are the most ardent believers, there are none so celebrated as prodigal sons returned. Indeed, “according to legend, the Most Holy Mother of God helped the Don and Zaporizhzhian Cossacks to withstand the siege of Azov, successfully repulsing attacks of a numerically stronger enemy,” the Russian Cossack Society said.
As the Kremlin’s “neo-Nazi” narrative becomes more and more tenuous and lacks the power to legitimate or motivate the invasion, so the reconquista narrative is strengthening in Russia. The long-promised “rebirth” of the Cossacks features more and more heavily in propaganda.
Originally declared in the 1990s, the “rebirth of the Cossacks” was at first manifested in decrees about repressed peoples, including those specifically relating to the Russian Cossacks. Now the metaphor of “rebirth” has been colonized by a regime which seeks to gather ideological sustenance to fuel its efforts.
A message of congratulation sent to President Putin on his 72nd birthday by Russian Cossack Ataman (leader) Vitaly Kuznetsov, for example, directly evoked the notion of “rebirth” (vozhrozhdenie), a term closely associated with the Cossacks.
“A quarter of a century ago in difficult times for our Motherland, you [Putin] took on yourself the leadership of our nation,” he wrote. “You were not chosen for the highest government service by the Russian people alone. You were chosen by the era itself, by the very course or historical events . . . you led our country to its rebirth, the return of the Russian people to greatness, on the path of recreating the Great Russian State.”
The “rebirth” of the Russian state has much in common with the rebirth of the Cossacks. So too has the construction of new, Russia-aligned, Cossack host (voiska) societies in the occupied lands of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, which is being cast as the “rebirth” of Cossack tradition “from loyal sons of Russia” in the “new territories.”
Kremlin plans to construct a new Cossack host in Russia itself, in the distinctly non-traditional lands of north-west Russia, including St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, is consistent with such a narrative. And there are signs it is genuinely popular with ordinary people.
Artem Sharlei, a Quisling minor official in the new Zaporizhzhia administration, sought to play down the significance and legitimacy of Cossacks in Ukraine before the invasion.
“There were Cossack societies in Ukraine, but they were simply costume groups trying to make money,” he said in an interview. “They did everything there except defend their Motherland, so the serving Cossacks are being formed there for the first time.”
Similarly, state Duma deputy Viktor Vodolatsky claimed that “the most important thing is that the Nazi ideology in Ukraine loses its foundation from which it springs. Our history is our Cossackdom. The anthem of Ukraine is based on the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks; if today we knock out this ideological crutch, the whole system of Ukraine will simply fall apart.”
The “Nazi” and “Cossack” narratives are substituted for each other, while mockery of the Ukrainian Cossacks’ Ataman epitomizes the contempt Russian Cossacks have for their ostensible brethren. For their part, too, the Ukrainians have also mocked Russian claims to the Cossack image.
Holidays sometimes unite, but in this case, Pokrova symbolizes the division between the two traditions.
By Richard Arnold. Richard Arnold is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Muskingum University, a member of the PONARS network, and was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in summer 2024. Article and pictures first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.
