The Pariahs’ Embrace: The Kremlin and the Taliban

By recognizing the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate authority, Moscow is trying to revive its waning geopolitical influence.

Press conference in Russia of representatives of the Taliban / Gleb Shhelkunov/Kommersant

Russia’s once-vaunted international stature is declining, a fact driven home by a series of setbacks in Ukraine and lackluster intergovernmental meetings that have exposed its limited ability to project military, rhetorical, and diplomatic power. 

The strains of the war in Ukraine, Moscow’s flailing status in the South Caucasus, a massive drop in Russian arms exports since 2022, and the high potential of the “Middle Corridor” trade route that avoids its territory are sapping Russia’s Great Power status. It has even been reported that the Kremlin may soon abandon efforts to modernize its single remaining Soviet-era aircraft carrier.

The Middle East offers another stark illustration of Russia’s waning influence, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December dealt a mighty blow to Moscow’s reputation. The USSR and later Russia served as sponsors for the Assad family’s dictatorship, and, since its demise, Moscow has lost leverage in Damascus and much of its presence in Tartus. Its failure to defend its old client state has also sullied Russia’s image as a strategic partner.

June’s Israeli and US operations against Iran’s military leaders, scientists, air defenses, and nuclear facilities have complicated matters. Russia’s measured response and unwillingness to assist Iran have further impaired its reputation. Moscow’s non-intercession underscored its own priorities, which are focused on Ukraine, and revealed its reluctance to stumble into another confrontation with the West.

Faced with its inability to deter military strikes on its allies, market weapons effectively, rally BRICS countries against the West, or compel Ukraine’s submission, Russia is now resorting to diplomatic posturing. Moscow’s recognition of Afghanistan’s Taliban government in July bears the hallmark of a diplomatic gambit. 

Having removed the Taliban from its list of banned terrorist groups in April, Russia was the first state to recognize Afghanistan’s de facto rulers.

Moscow’s stated rationale for giving the Taliban official recognition centered on enhanced “bilateral cooperation” in “energy, transport, agriculture, and infrastructure.” It said it sees the Taliban as an “ally” in the fight against terrorism, and the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, carried out by members of Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), provides a sound rationale for enhanced security cooperation with Kabul. 

But the Kremlin’s recognition of the Taliban suggests a move more in line with preserving its fading Great Power prestige than realpolitik.

Russia had been engaging in trade with the Taliban before recognizing the group as legitimate, and its prior “muted diplomacy” approach to Kabul’s rulers seemed aimed at preventing Central Asian states from asserting greater autonomy while Moscow reworked its military strategy in Ukraine in the latter half of 2022. 

Though it might reap some benefits from investing in Afghanistan and security advantages from partnering with the Taliban, the pay-off will likely prove unimpressive. The Taliban have no intention of backing Russia’s war aims in Ukraine, and Moscow’s diplomatic posturing will lack substance if other states do not follow its lead.

Russia’s presumed hope that it would trigger widespread recognition for the Taliban across the Global South has so far gained no traction. Many states are engaging with the Taliban, receiving their diplomats and sending delegations to Kabul, but they stand to gain little from validating the group’s authority. 

The lack of a cascade of official recognitions echoes Russia’s history of cultivating ties with rogues in the face of established international principles. Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after its invasion of Georgia, for example, also failed to spark widespread international recognition, with most viewing the breakaway regions as puppets of the Kremlin. 

Similarly, prior to Moscow’s illegal annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk (in addition to other regions of Ukraine), their sham independent status had only been acknowledged by Syria, North Korea, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (with the latter’s recognition considerably predating all others). Even Kazakhstan, a very close Russian ally, has publicly stated it will not recognize “quasi-state territories.”

Russia’s recognition of the Taliban’s legitimacy may help Moscow preserve its guarantor position over Central Asia and, in due course, other states are likely to recognize the group as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. China “welcomes” Russia’s legitimation of the Taliban, and Pakistan and Uzbekistan have signed an agreement with Kabul’s rulers to conduct a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan Railway project. Yet the Taliban’s appalling human rights record and blatant disregard for the rights of women and minorities remain an extremely pressing international concern.

Similar to Putin, Hibatullah Akhundzada, the group’s Supreme Leader, faces an ICC arrest warrant. Officially recognizing the Taliban in its current form thus embodies a rejection of Western values, and it appears only Russia is willing, at least for now, to take such a provocative step. 

Moscow’s legitimation of the Taliban amounts to a symbolic act by a diminishing Great Power, equivalent to one sanctioned pariah acknowledging another outcast regime, largely to spite the West.

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By Charles Sullivan. Charles Sullivan is the author of Motherland: Soviet Nostalgia in the Russian Federation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022) and Leaders of the Nation: Kazakhstan during the Twilight of the Nazarbayev Era and the Russo-Ukrainian War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2025). Article first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.