My Enemy’s Enemy — Taiwan and Eastern Europe
- Res Publica
- 6 days ago
- 3 min read
When I was invited to speak at a seminar on resilience in Taiwan, I didn’t expect to find a mirror, writes Ieva Ilves.

Source: The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania
My work has been rooted in Eastern European security — in Latvia, NATO, Ukraine, and digital and cyber defense. The Indo-Pacific felt like someone else’s front line. But as the discussions in Taipei unfolded, I was struck by how familiar it all sounded.
Both regions face the same dismissive international attitudes, endure similar patterns of authoritarian pressure from China and Russia, and now confront increasingly coordinated threats from the two dictatorships. Just as many once questioned whether Ukrainians would truly resist Russian aggression, skeptics now wonder whether Taiwanese society has the will and means to push back — especially given its deep business ties with mainland China.
This may not be a natural friendship, but it’s a necessary one, forced not by geography, but by geopolitics. And it’s growing stronger precisely because our adversaries are growing bolder and increasingly coordinated.
The evidence is stark: China now accounts for 89% of Russia’s microchip imports since the all-out war began, providing critical semiconductors that power military drones and tanks. The two countries are intimately linked in the Kremlin’s drone warfare campaign against Ukraine; Putin has ordered collaboration with China on artificial intelligence research, and Chinese ships induced by Russian intelligence systematically damaged undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan. This isn’t a coincidence — it’s strategic coordination that demands an equally strategic and coordinated response.
While autocracies can act fast because they face little internal debate, democracies too have strengths. We enjoy decentralized but robust societies where business partnerships, R&D collaboration, and societal cooperation thrive. This forced friendship presents genuine strategic opportunities for both Taiwan and Europe. Consider the stakes: Europe learned about strategic dependencies the hard way with Russian energy. Taiwan makes more than half the world’s microchips, including more than 90% of the most advanced varieties; any disruption to semiconductor production would have profound effects on the global economy.
Taiwan’s technological prowess and Europe’s push for secure supply chains create natural synergies. As both regions work to reduce dependence on authoritarian-controlled supply chains, partnerships in semiconductor design, cybersecurity, and digital infrastructure become business requirements, not just economic opportunities. Europe’s manufacturing independence goals align perfectly with Taiwan’s need for diversified partnerships beyond its complex relationship with mainland China.
Consider the practical opportunities: The decision by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to invest €10bn ($11.7bn) in a Dresden fabrication plant represents Europe’s largest semiconductor manufacturing investment, with production starting in 2027. The 2023 EU-Taiwan Investment Forum brought together nine European semiconductor clusters with over 150 participants, creating concrete R&D collaboration.
Most recently, the US chipmaking and design giant NVIDIA announced its new Taiwan headquarters — dubbed Constellation — to be built in Taipei’s Beitou-Shilin area, signaling the company’s deep commitment yet to the island’s tech ecosystem. These aren’t abstract policy goals — they’re concrete business partnerships that create benefits for all. European firms gain access to cutting-edge chip design expertise and secure supply chains, while Taiwanese companies expand into new markets and diversify their customer base beyond China.
Our strategic thinking is much closer than our physical distance and cultural diversity suggest. Our democratic cooperation must match our adversaries’ coordination. What happens in the Taiwan Strait won’t stay in Asia. And the hard-won experience of Central and Eastern Europeans should enable them to see it clearly.
It’s time we stopped treating these friendships as distant or accidental. They are essential — and urgent.
By Ieva Ilves. Ieva Ilves has more than two decades of experience in digital transformation, cybersecurity and international affairs. Her career spans high-level roles in Latvia, Estonia and internationally, including as Digital Policy Advisor to Latvia’s President. She led Latvia’s first national cybersecurity strategy and the project to establish NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga. She advises Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation and WithSecure, a Finnish cybersecurity company. She has a Master’s from Johns Hopkins University SAIS. Article first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.
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