The Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been ongoing since 2014, has caused changes in the perception of Ukraine in the world. Abroad, they began to talk more about Ukrainian history and culture. And this also applies to the media, where the coverage of Ukrainian topics has changed, because journalists of world publications wrote about Ukraine for a long time while working in the Moscow bureau. Peter Dickinson, journalist, publisher, and editor of the Atlantic Council's Ukraine Alert blog, talked about how Russian propaganda works in the West, about the peculiarities of the British worldview, and Ukraine's strategic communications in an interview with Detector Media.
—What is the main aim of the Ukraine alert blog? What is your main audience?
—The Ukraine alert project was established in 2014, after the invasion of Crimea. It was created due to the need for good-quality English information about Ukraine. One of the big problems that Ukraine always had was a low international profile.
This was amplified by the practice of covering Ukraine via Moscow-based correspondents who would typically include a strong Russian perspective in their coverage of Ukraine.
Ukraine was often invisible internationally. And when it was seen, it was seen through a Russian prism. This was a big issue for Ukraine’s national security and for international understanding of the country. So, the idea behind the Ukraine Alert project was to provide information about Ukraine from a Ukrainian perspective.
— How do you see the impact of Russian propaganda in the West after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine?
— I think there are three main directions of Russian propaganda for Russia’s disinformation operations. There is the Nazi front, NATO front, and anticolonial front.
The Nazi narrative is mostly used for domestic Russian audiences. Before 2022, there were some in the West who repeated such claims of a Nazi problem in Ukraine. But this collapsed in 2022 because the vast majority of international journalists finally understood that it was nonsense. The election of Zelenskyy played a big role in that. So the Nazi narrative does not work with mainstream international audiences. They clearly understand that Ukraine is a democracy – an imperfect one, but a democracy. The idea of some sort of fascist government in Kyiv is recognized as nonsense.
This Nazi myth still works for domestic Russian audiences. They are very much conditioned to view «Ukraine» and «Nazi» as synonyms. In the Putin’s regime’s propaganda reality, Ukrainian identity is essentially Nazi identity. And so it follows that the denazification of Ukraine means the deukrainization of Ukraine. Russians understand this very clearly. It’s essentially a genocidal narrative that aims to dehumanize and delegitimize Ukraine.
In the West the main argument to justify the war is NATO. Putin says the war is NATO’s fault and blames NATO expansion for provoking this war. This is very effective internationally. A lot of foreign politicians, commentators, and academics repeat this narrative. They often say we don’t approve of what Russia is doing but argue that it is nevertheless NATO's fault.
The NATO narrative has proved particularly effective among the anti-establishment or anti-globalist camp in the West. However, it has been undermined since 2022 by the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden. Putin says NATO is a threat, but when these two nearby countries, one a neighbour, actually join NATO, Russia does nothing. Russia has repeatedly stated «we don’t care». They have significantly demilitarized their border with Finland. Clearly, Russia doesn’t see NATO as a threat. Thankfully, people are starting to notice and draw logical conclusions.
The NATO argument still works to a degree because there are a lot of people in the West who are inclined to blame their own governments for everything. NATO is seen as an extension of American power and a symbol of the collective West, so the NATO argument appeals to that group.
The NATO symbol near the Alliance headquarters in Brussels. Source
Broadly speaking, Russia uses the Nazi narrative when justifying the invasion of Ukraine to domestic audiences, and the NATO narrative with Western audiences. When it comes to the Global South, which represents the vast majority of global audiences, Russian is pushing an anti-colonial narrative. This plays on anti-Western sentiment in countries that were formerly colonized and continue to resent the dominant role of the West in global affairs. Russia depicts the invasion of Ukraine as an attempt to fight back against Western imperialism.
This is proving to be quite successful, largely because the countries in the Global South tend to have a limited knowledge of Russian or Ukrainian history but are well aware of the Soviet Union’s role in the global anti-colonial movement during the second half of the twentieth century. As a result, many feel Russia is historically on their side. The fact that Russia is waging an openly colonial war in Ukraine is simply ignored.
I would say this propaganda success is limited in scope because the Global South is not very active in its support of Russia. Most countries refuse to provide weapons and don’t even vote with Russia at the United Nations. It’s a limited success because it’s not bringing Russia a lot of benefits. However, it is also preventing a global consensus from emerging and allowing Russia to proclaim that only the West is against us. It’s the West against Russia and the rest of the world is basically neutral, with a handful of countries actively supporting Russia.
— How do you see the image of Ukraine in the West changed?
— Ukraine’s image has changed dramatically because of changes in the information space over the last 2 years. Ukraine has always had very significant image problems. Ukraine was a blank sheet of paper essentially. This allowed the Russians to create all sorts of myths: Ukrainians are Nazis, there is no Ukraine, and so on. For centuries, international audiences had been encouraged to view Ukraine as part of Russia. Few understood the difference between the USSR and Russia. So after 1991, Ukraine faced huge challenges.
When these countries became independent there was a certain credibility problem. We had barely heard of these places. So there were issues relating to a low international profile and Russian propaganda. All these things played against Ukrainians as they sought to shake off centuries of imperial oppression and establish an independent national identity, both at home and abroad. At first, progress was very slow. Since 2022, because of the actions of the Ukrainian people, their heroism, courage, and successes on the battlefield, preceptions of Ukraine have undergone a radical transformation. International audiences now understand that Ukraine is not Russia. This is fundamental. They know it is a very patriotic country, with a deepening sense of national identity and a strong desire to shape its future. There is no question that Ukrainians have left a huge impression on the outside world since February 2022.
If you are in the military or defense sector, you want to speak to Ukrainians and learn from them. Ukrainians are now fighting for survival and every specialist is needed. But I think in future, defense tech companies around the world will want to hire Ukrainians because they have proven skills and unrivalled experience.
Ukraine is also now looking increasingly attractive to investors. This is new. Despite the destruction of the war, it is seen as a country with a bright future as part of the European Union and the wider Western community of nations. For decades, Ukraine was seen as poor and corrupt. You might invest in a corrupt country, but rarely if it is both poor and corrupt. Now Ukraine is seen as a strong emerging democracy, a brave country, a country that will remain in the geopolitical spotlight for years to come. It is an exciting country with an amazing tech sector.
— You initially came to Ukraine to work for the British Council in Lviv. What was it like to work as a British citizen in Ukraine in the late 1990s?
— My role as British Council Information Manager involved promoting British Council and British Embassy projects in Western Ukraine. So I traveled a lot throughout West Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Uzhgorod, Chernivtsi). I met regional officials and visited the various projects that we had, university exchange projects, individual business projects.
We worked a lot with civil society, which was just starting to develop but already very dynamic and vibrant. We brought together a lot of the different civil society groups active in West Ukraine and helped foster cooperation.
— I want to talk about British-Ukrainian relations. Why do you think Britain became more active in terms of support in Ukraine since 2014?
— Well, I would say Britain has always been supportive of Ukraine, but I wouldn’t say 2014 was the watershed moment. I think it's much more the current war when Britain has really changed its stance and really become one of the leading nations in terms of support for Ukraine.
There are a couple of factors here. One is the Brexit factor. After Brexit, there was a lot of concern that Britain would lose its status in the world, that we would lose our influence. Critics said we would no longer be regarded as a serious world power. This is in some ways a continuation of Britain’s post-imperial complex, which was a feature throughout the second half of the twentieth century. So there was always this sense of Britain in retreat.
So when it became increasingly apparent that we might see a major escalation in Russia's war in Ukraine, this was a moment for Britain to stand up. That’s not to say that British support is purely a consequence of post-Brexit anxieties regarding Britain’s place in the world. This support also fits the British vision of the world.
I think a lot of people outside of Britain don't really appreciate that for British people, the British Empire is not our core focus in terms of national identity. Indeed, it barely features in our education system. It's not something we see as the basis of our identity. The British Empire is just something that kind of happened in «a fit of absence of mind».
Some people are proud of the British Empire, many are ashamed or embarrassed. But mostly it's just pushed to the side. Instead, the British national identity is very much rooted in the sense of doing the right thing and supporting the underdog, supporting oppressed nations and especially standing up to tyrants. The British are very proud of their position in World War II as the first nation to oppose Hitler in 1939 and the nation that stood alone in 1940.
From the fall of France in 1940 to the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Britain was alone and stood against Hitler when there was a lot of pressure to negotiate some kind deal with Hitler that would have granted the Nazis victory. Britain said no and fought on. That spirit of summer 1940 still has huge influence on how the British people see themselves. This is why Churchill is frequently named as the most popular British politician ever, despite his otherwise unspectacular political career and his involvement in many of the darker chapters of the colonial era.
So when it became clear that Putin was poised to dramatically expand his invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the British saw this as very much their cause. Boris Johnson specifically played an important role here because he is a massive Churchill fan. Like Churchill, he's a charismatic former journalist who went into politics. If you look at British politics today, Boris Johnson is now long gone, but support for Ukraine is still very strong from both leading parties. The British public remains firmly behind Ukraine and this support will continue.
— What is the public opinion on Russia inside the UK?
— Most British people have neither detailed knowledge of Russia nor any particular interest in the country. This is to be expected. In general, British society is remarkably inward-looking, given the country’s global impact. Britain has played a leading role in shaping the modern world, whether its in terms of politics and business or things like football, rugby, cricket, golf, snooker, darts, and all the other sports that emerged in Britain and spread around the globe. Then there is popular culture, from the Beatles and Rolling Stones to Queen and Led Zepellin and so many more, or iconic literary heroes such as Robin Hood, James Bond, Sherlock Holmes, or Harry Potter. But British culture is very insular. People don't really know a lot about the rest of the world.
I grew up during the Cold War and we had very little interest in the Soviet Union, which was viewed as a giant concentration camp behind an Iron Curtain. People would regularly flee from there to us, which was all most people needed to know. When the Soviet Union collapsed, there was very little celebration in Britain. People didn't say, wow, we won the Cold War. They just shrugged and were happy for the people no longer living in the Soviet prison of nations. But that was about it. No jubilation at all. If anything, I think most people in Britain today view Putin’s Russia in similar terms as a tyranny.
— What is the vision in the West regarding Ukrainian victory and Russia's defeat?
— I think they understand the need to liberate Ukraine but there's absolutely zero appetite for the West to become more directly involved in the war. There is a fear that Russia will collapse. In 1991 we saw exactly the same thing. Margaret Thatcher was against the fall of the Soviet Union, George Bush Senior was against the fall of the Soviet Union. This is one of the great myths that the West was desperate to break up the Soviet Union. They didn't want it at all. Probably the most simple definition of victory would be a free Ukraine. Some people in the West say we need a Korean or German solution, but that would not bring peace.
— And what should we do more in terms of information policy and strategic communications?
— We talk a lot about countering Russian narratives and Russian disinformation. But I don't think this should be the main effort because fundamentally that doesn't win people over to your cause.
— What should be the main effort in your point of view?
— Ukraine needs to tell its story to the world. Ukraine has an epic story. This is an imperial war that didn't begin in 2022, What we're seeing now is the latest stage in a long European genocide. That’s a hugely important message. This is a genocide. This is an attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation.
What would a Russian victory mean? It would mean that genocide is possible, the destruction of a nation is possible, in 21st century Europe. If its possible here, it's possible anywhere.
What lessons will the Iranians take from that? What will the Chinese do after that? What about the North Koreans? Any number of dictators in Africa and the Middle East may treat that as a green light. Russian victory will destabilize the entire world for decades to come. It will radically transform the international security environment. Those who currently cheer Russia because they resent the West will learn that the alternative to a world shaped by Western leadership is infinitely worse.
By Yehor Brailian. Article and pictures first time published on the Detector Media web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.
