The Kremlin has continued its relentless campaign to gain influence in Africa in 2024. Leading this effort are not only its diplomatic tours, arms sales, and military deployments of the Wagner Group and the new Afrika Corps, but also Russia’s continuous information operations. Across the continent, Russian and Russian-aligned media organisations routinely disseminate the Kremlin’s narratives about world events and about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Many of these activities are run by ostensibly private actors who take cues – if not instructions – from the Kremlin. One case was that of the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, who provided Russian intelligence with plausible deniability in their disinformation campaigns worldwide, including in Africa. Others have a more direct connection to the Kremlin, such as the state-controlled media RT, Sputnik and TV BRICS. Finally, there are the representatives of the Russian state, found in the embassies and in organisations run by Moscow, which act internationally.
Franchises from Dakar to Luanda
One of these official organisations is called Russian Cooperation or Rossotrudnichestvo [1], also known as Russia House (Russkyi Dom), and its cultural cooperation franchises abroad. Since 2022, and despite Russia’s growing isolation and budgetary constraints from its aggression against Ukraine, the activities and franchises of Russia House have been blooming across Africa, from Dakar to Luanda. What role does Rossotrudnichestvo and its Russia House branches play in Russia’s foreign policy towards the African continent?
Kremlin understanding of ‘soft power’
Rossotrudnichestvo resembles a cultural cooperation organisation, with language education, cultural promotion, and cooperation in higher education being its main activities abroad. At a glance, it implements Russia’s cultural cooperation policy in a similar way to the Institut Français or the Goethe Institut in the cases of France and Germany – organisations given the role of contributing to the ‘soft power’ of their home countries. Russian language courses provided by Rossotrudnichestvo are typically free, and it sponsors and organises exhibitions of Russian artists internationally.
In addition, Russia House branches organise associations of Russians abroad, as well as groups of graduates from Russian and Soviet universities. The organisation also has a developmental and humanitarian aid component, focusing on Russian-speaking communities abroad. Part of the appeal of the Russia House is the promise of scholarships for studies in Russia; reportedly, student recruitment is used as one of the organisation’s performance indicators. All of these play an important role in Russian foreign policy, especially as part of the Kremlin’s understanding of ‘soft power’.
Key role for information space
In the 2000s, ‘soft power’ became a commonplace notion among Kremlin policymakers. However, this notion diverged from the sense commonly used elsewhere. This interest in ‘soft power’ is the result of Russia’s post-1991 wars. In the aftermath of the 1994 and 2000 wars with Chechnya, and the 2008 war with Georgia, the Kremlin drew lessons about the importance of global public opinion in shaping war, especially in preventing the growth of international sympathy for Moscow’s opponents. After 2014, hard power became the central element of Russia’s international relations, yet the information space retained a key role in the Kremlin’s foreign policy.
Rossotrudnichestvo is part of the state-controlled organisations meant to shape the informational environment for Moscow’s foreign policy objectives, that being the reason it has been under EU sanctions since June 2022. Indeed, as Rossotrudnichestvo’s official page describes, the organisation seeks to ‘strengthen Russia’s humanitarian influence in the world’, with its branches abroad opening solely with the explicit approval of the Russian president.
Officially founded in 2008, Rossotrudnichestvo is under the authority of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with nearly all its 54 million euro budget (its value in 2020) coming from the federal government. The leadership of the organisation – both in its management and its Public Board – consists mostly of United Russia members and former top government officials. It is also the Presidential Administration who may appoint and dismiss the directors of the organisation.
Screening RT films
Russia House branches frequently screen RT films on global issues, which rely on distorted and tendentious narratives on current affairs, and whitewash Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, in particular its war against Ukraine. Under the cover of advocating for Russian culture, Rossotrudnichestvo also promotes through lectures, exhibits, and events, the narrative of ‘Russophobia’. Namely, the idea that Western – especially Ukrainian, Polish and Baltic – policy towards Russia is driven by irrational hatred rather than security concerns. Other common topics of disinformation include the Kremlin’s tendentious views of history, which underplay Soviet repression and Russian colonialism.
Cooperation with Russian intelligence
Rossotrudnichestvo does not act on its own. According to its own regulations, it is tasked with cooperating with other governmental agencies to advance Russian foreign policy. In 2018, the Washington Post revealed that the organisation cooperated with Russian intelligence to establish two ostensibly humanitarian NGOs to act as relays for Russian disinformation. Other activities are closer to espionage tout court.
According to another Washington Post report, Rossotrudnichestvo has acted as a cover for Russian intelligence officers seeking to recruit spies. One case was discovered in the organisation’s Russia House branch in the US, where an ‘illegal’ officer (acting without diplomatic cover) collected information on potential spies who could work for the Russian state.
New Russia Houses in the Sahel
Given its reliance on Russian culture, Rossotrudnichestvo focuses its activities on countries formerly under Moscow’s control, especially within the notion of the ‘Russian world’. Yet, that does not preclude operations elsewhere. According to its official website, there are 86 official Russia House branches abroad, with four operating in Northern Africa and another four in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In addition, there are ‘private’ Russia House franchises across the continent, from Chad to Sierra Leone. Opened by ostensibly independent NGOs, the timing of the opening of these franchises often coincides with Russia’s foreign policy. The opening of the three central Sahel branches followed the rise of the pro-Russia junta regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, and the franchises of Equatorial Guinea, Somalia and Sierra Leone followed the diplomatic rapprochement of those countries with Moscow.
Targeting young people and elites
Like elsewhere, Russia’s information war in Africa targets young people and elites – those with university education, set to join or already working in highly qualified positions across governments and society. Organising associations of graduates from Russian and Soviet universities is a key activity of Rossotrudnichestvo in Africa. According to some estimates, there may be as many as 50 000 African graduates from Soviet higher education, in addition to several thousand graduates of Russian universities. The Russia House private franchises are often opened by local graduates from Russian and Soviet universities, under an agreement of cooperation with Rossotrudnichestvo which includes abiding by both local and Russian laws.
Across Africa, university scholarships are at the centre of the Russia House appeal. Africa’s growing demographics have put heavy pressure on local higher education, creating a ‘vast’ African demand for study abroad. In their offer across African countries, Rossotrudnichestvo makes a direct connection between their Russian language courses and scholarships to enrol at Russian universities. According to the organisation, over 26 000 students from various African countries received a scholarship to study in the 2024/2025 academic year. Overall, the Russian government claims that the number of African students in Russia was 34 000 in 2023, 100% more than the 17 000 students in 2019, and 8% of the total 430 000 African students abroad.
Travelling, training, socialising in Russia
Rossotrudnichestvo involves young African practitioners in other ways as well, especially through the ‘New Generation’ presidential programme. This programme involves – among other activities – paying for young state officials in African countries to travel to events in Russia and take part in them. For example, between 1-6 October 2024, a Rossotrudnichestvo-funded forum on international security took place in Moscow, with African participants – mostly state officials from several countries across Sub-Saharan Africa – receiving travel funds from their local Russia House branches. The forum featured common themes in Russian diplomatic discourse, again underplaying Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, and portraying the West as inherently hostile to Russia and the ‘Global South’. Similar arrangements have paid for African specialists in other areas to travel in order to train and socialise with their Russian counterparts.
Putin’s birthday and historical revisionism
Russia House seeks to create goodwill towards Russia in other ways as well. For example, the Russia House in Niamey released and seemingly produced a music video celebrating Vladimir Putin’s birthday. Other activities are less eye-catching but equally noxious. The Niamey Russia House opened its venue with an exhibition portraying the 1380 Battle of Kulikovo as Russia’s war of independence, obliquely comparing it to Niger’s own struggle for independence. This case also illustrates Russia’s attempts to distort history, as the battle was fought between a coalition of east Slavonic principalities belonging to the Kyivan Rus, not Russia. Historical revisionism is among the reasons why Rossotrudnichestvo is under EU sanctions.
Whitewashing Russia’s foreign policy
Other narratives involve disinformation on current affairs. It is common for RT films to go on tour around Russia House branches, with their Africa-focused products receiving screenings across the continent. A recent film called ‘Battle for Africa’ (Bitva za Afriku) was screened at Russia House branches in Egypt, Tunisia and Zambia, as well as in other countries, including Argentina, India and Lebanon. The film promotes Russia’s particular idea of ‘multipolarity’, with a supposedly anti-colonial narrative that whitewashes Russia’s foreign policy across the world, including in Africa. In addition, Russia House cooperates with the RT Academy, which in October 2024 held an online course ostensibly meant to train African journalists in detecting ‘fake media’. That initiative presented a clear bias against international media.
Many times, these narratives are oriented towards supporting local Russian partners. In the central Sahel, the Russia House branches in Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou actively portray their activities as happening in the framework of enhanced cooperation with Moscow.
Exploiting curiosity and aspirations for war
Despite these efforts, opinion polls do not suggest that Russia’s attempts at building goodwill and whitewashing its foreign policy are an overwhelming success. In a 34-country poll, Afrobarometer found China to be the most popular ‘external influence’ in the continent in 2019-2021, with 63% of respondents favouring Beijing, compared to 60% for Washington, and 46% for former colonial capitals. At the same time, 35% favoured Moscow.
A 2023 Pew poll found divided views on Russia in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. A 2023 IPSOS poll showed respondents in Africa divided when it came to African neutrality in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, with slim majorities favouring disengagement from the war. These numbers do not preclude positive sentiments towards Russia in certain contexts. For example, a 2023 poll found 90% of Malian respondents trusted Moscow to help the Malian military fight in the security crisis of their country.
Studying a foreign language, pursuing education abroad, and learning about cultures different from one’s own are all laudable activities. Local interest in the activities of Russia House cannot be attributed exclusively to pro-Kremlin views. However, by involving them in Russia’s information war, Russia House and Rossotrudnichestvo exploit the curiosity and aspirations of people in their host countries in service of the Kremlin’s war efforts.
Worse, the appeal of study, work-study or simply living abroad in Russia has been routinely exploited by the Kremlin to feed its war machine directly, beyond information. According to Associated Press, hundreds of Africans have been duped into working in ‘slave’-like conditions at Russo-Iranian arms factories by promises of work-study programmes. Similarly, Jeune Afrique reports that hundreds of Africans are fighting on Russia’s side, with a large part of them also brought to Russia on fake work-study programmes, or recruited directly from Russian universities. The casualty rates among Africans pressed into fighting for Russia are high.
[1] Its full name is Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation.
Article and pictures first time published on the EUvsDisinfo web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.
