The Baltic states, with a long history of Russian interference, offer a model for tackling hybrid threats.
On Halloween, Lithuania marked a significant milestone in its journey to energy independence by unveiling a clock in Vilnius to count down 100 days until the Baltic states — Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia — disconnect from the Soviet-era BRELL electricity grid linking them to Russia and Belarus.
The change, on February 8, will coincide with synchronization to the Continental European Network and drastically cut Moscow’s ability to exert malign influence.
The Baltic states’ actions to address their vulnerabilities, especially in the energy sector, have put them at the forefront of nations countering hybrid threats. While some steps still need to be accomplished, they have demonstrated remarkable determination in tackling the task.
Given their geographical location and historic ties to Russia, the Baltics are uniquely vulnerable to hybrid aggression and, over the past decades, have faced a blend of Russian and, increasingly, Chinese hybrid tactics. Their response has lessons for the rest of the world.
Reliance on Russian energy was leaving the Baltic States vulnerable to supply manipulation and disruption, price hikes, monopolization of energy imports, disinformation campaigns, political pressure, “shadow” influence, and cyberattacks.
Historically, Moscow exerted political pressure by using energy as a weapon. In the winter of 1992, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin halted oil deliveries to Lithuania, citing payment disputes, in an attempt to influence decision-making in Vilnius.
The Baltics have taken a resolute and proactive approach to confronting and mitigating these risks. Lithuania’s strategic initiatives have included:
Diversifying oil imports through the offshore Būtingė terminal in the 1990s enabled supply from different sources.
Implementing the EU 2009 Third Energy Package to liberalize energy markets, allowing the separation of energy supply and generation from transmission networks. The electricity sector was unbundled in 2012, and natural gas two years later.
Opening the Klaipėda LNG terminal in 2014. Named “Independence,” it takes gas imports from various suppliers and allowed Lithuania to cut Russian gas imports entirely after the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On December 6, Lithuania assumed ownership over the LNG terminal.
New power interconnections, including the NordBalt underwater cable from Sweden and the LitPolLink with Poland, which became operational in 2015, facilitated electricity trade, enhanced grid stability, and reduced dependency on Russia.
Lithuania has also implemented legal measures to safeguard its critical infrastructure. Foreign direct investment in sectors deemed vital to national security — including energy and infrastructure — is subject to a stringent screening process.
Investing in wind and solar to work toward 100% renewable electricity by 2050.
As well as reinforcing energy supply, these initiatives have strengthened national security by reducing the opportunities for Russia’s malign meddling.
Yet the increasing frequency of cyber incidents against Lithuania’s energy infrastructure highlights the continued risks to the stability and security of the nation’s energy system. Regional underwater connections (NordBalt, Estlink, telecommunication links) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals also face constant challenges from Russian covert operations such as sabotage and espionage.
While the decision to finalize synchronization with the Continental European Network marks the culmination of a series of joint infrastructure projects, some dependence on Russia persists.
Addressing these vulnerabilities requires robust monitoring, strengthened security measures, and sustained international collaboration to adapt critical infrastructure and safeguard it from Moscow’s interference.
As part of this, Lithuania has been taking steps to reduce its reliance on Russian expertise when dealing with radioactive waste from the decommissioned Soviet-era Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.
It has also joined other Baltic states and the EU in the Rail Baltica project, which seeks (albeit quite slowly) to address the reliance on Russian broad-gauge railway tracks by constructing a European-standard railway that will enhance links between the Baltics, Poland, and Western Europe.
Some threats, especially those rooted in geography, are more intractable. The Astravets Nuclear Power Plant in Belarus, for example, poses a hybrid threat to Lithuania due to its proximity to Vilnius and its perceived lack of adherence to international safety standards.
Fake claims of a nuclear accident at Astravets could trigger panic and even force inhabitants of Vilnius to evacuate, making it a potential weapon for Russia and Belarus to disrupt Lithuanian society.
The transit of goods and passengers between mainland Russia and its Kaliningrad exclave via Lithuania also poses a recognized risk. Analysts warn the route could be exploited for activities like the “green men” tactics seen in Crimea in 2014 and say failing to address its misuse undermines Lithuania’s security.
Despite a history of heavy reliance on Russian infrastructure and energy, the Baltic states have emerged as a model for countering hybrid threats. Their resilience underscores the value of strategic foresight and adaptability.
Measures such as integrating with the European electricity grid will significantly reduce Russia’s influence, bolstering sovereignty and security. These efforts offer a roadmap for nations facing similar challenges, emphasizing the critical need to reduce dependencies and strengthen alliances.
By Eitvydas Bajarūnas. Eitvydas Bajarūnas is an ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, and currently a Center for Europe Policy Analysis (CEPA) Visiting Fellow. Article and pictures first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.
