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Eastern Europe’s “Isolation Belt”: Russia’s Informational Influence on the 2024 Elections

How Moscow exploited elections in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania to undermine Ukraine?

The year 2024 stands out as a historic moment for global democracy. In what has been the most election-packed year in history, 78 countries conducted elections, including 21 referendums and 119 other electoral events. According to Election Guide, nearly a billion people worldwide participated in these processes. Yet, this “year of elections” has also underscored growing concerns about the stability of democracies worldwide.


In Russia, 2024 brought another staged “election” as Vladimir Putin secured another term in office through a tightly controlled and heavily manipulated process. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s presidential elections were postponed due to martial law. In contrast, many of Ukraine’s neighbors and strategically important nations held elections, with significant implications for Kyiv’s future.


Ukrainian political scientist and far-right movement expert Anton Shekhovtsov explained that Moscow’s “Plan A” involves seeking compromises with key political players to advance its geopolitical interests. Examples of such alliances include Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Slovakia’s Robert Fico, and Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić. When that fails, Moscow shifts to “Plan B,” forging ties with populists on the far-right and far-left, as seen with Germany’s Alternative for Germany party.


This article examines Russia’s informational influence on the 2024 elections in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania. Each of these Eastern European nations plays a unique role for Kyiv, and their foreign policy decisions could significantly impact Ukraine’s European trajectory and long-term victory.


The Disconnected Trio


Moscow views Moldova and Georgia, like other former Soviet republics, as part of its “near abroad” and seeks to maintain their dependence on Russia while obstructing their integration with the West. Moldova and Georgia, along with Ukraine, form the “Associated Trio,” a regional alliance striving for deeper European integration and eventual EU membership.


When the alliance was established in 2021, it symbolized a potential wave of EU expansion that threatened Moscow’s ambitions to resurrect its Soviet-era sphere of influence. Russia’s goal has been to derail the trio’s European aspirations, discredit their pro-European agendas, and bolster pro-Russian forces within their borders — particularly during electoral periods marked by political instability.


Georgia’s election turmoil


On October 26, Georgia held parliamentary elections marred by widespread fraud and irregularities. The ruling Georgian Dream party, known for its alignment with Moscow, claimed victory. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili denounced the elections as “Russian” in nature, citing systematic fraud and the effective disenfranchisement of voters. Nationwide protests erupted, with demonstrators demanding a rerun. The European Parliament criticized the elections as a further erosion of democracy, labeling them neither free nor fair, and called for new elections under international supervision.


Throughout the campaign, Georgian Dream echoed Kremlin propaganda, suggesting that the West aimed to drag Georgia into a war with Russia. One of the party’s central messages warned voters against a “Ukraine-like” scenario. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev fueled these fears, claiming that Georgia’s involvement in a Western-led confrontation with Russia would end disastrously. Protests were dismissed as yet another “color revolution” by Russian officials.


Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova further reinforced this narrative, asserting that Georgians should “decide for themselves” who poses the real threat. According to the Carnegie Europe Center, Georgian Dream’s portrayal of the elections as a choice between peace and war resonated more strongly with voters than the opposition’s framing of a choice between Russia and the EU.


The Kremlin’s influence extended beyond election day. In late November, Georgia’s prime minister announced the suspension of EU negotiations and a refusal of EU grants until 2028, triggering another wave of mass protests. Authorities responded with force, while Russian propaganda intensified efforts to delegitimize the demonstrations and the pro-European sentiment among Georgians.


Georgia has endured repeated Kremlin aggression, including the occupation of parts of its territory. Despite this history, official Tbilisi is increasingly drawn into Moscow’s sphere of influence. Russian propaganda touts Georgia as a success story, portraying it as proof that post-Soviet states have no viable alternatives to Russian dominance. The narrative promotes "reconciliation" with Russian aggression in exchange for "non-aggression," effectively normalizing subjugation to Moscow’s agenda.


Moldova: A Battleground for European Integration


In late October and early November, Moldova held presidential elections and a referendum on EU membership, both marred by Russian attempts to meddle. Pro-Western President Maia Sandu secured a resounding victory over pro-Russian Socialist candidate Alexandru Stoyanoglou, but the referendum on EU integration revealed only a slim majority in favor of joining the bloc.


Moscow’s efforts to derail the process centered on the so-called “Shor network,” led by fugitive pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor. Sanctioned by the EU in May 2023 for destabilizing Moldova, the network orchestrated vote-buying schemes and disseminated anti-EU propaganda. Moldovan authorities exposed these tactics, revealing that in September 2024 alone, more than 130,000 Moldovans received over $15 million in cash from Russia to influence the vote.


This election was conducted under unprecedented interference and intimidation by Russia and its proxies, aiming to destabilize Moldova’s democratic processes,” said EU spokesperson Peter Stano. Reports detailed widespread vote-buying, “carousel” voting facilitated by organized transport, and a disinformation campaign targeting the electorate. Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister Cristina Gerasimova stated that Russia invested nearly €100 million to disrupt both the presidential election and the referendum, highlighting the Kremlin’s interest in installing a pro-Moscow government to ease its war efforts against Ukraine.


The U.S. and EU warned against Russia’s campaign to block Moldova’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova framed Sandu’s victory and Moldova’s EU referendum result as “Western interference,” accusing the West of turning Moldova into a “Russophobic NATO appendage.”


Russia’s dual strategies — leveraging ruling elites in Georgia (“Plan A”) and courting opposition forces in Moldova (“Plan B”) — achieved mixed results. Yet the overarching objective remains clear: derailing the Associated Trio’s European integration. Should Moscow succeed in knocking even one member off the path to the EU, the progress of the others would be jeopardized. As EU membership often hinges on a “package” approach, the defection of one partner could unravel the collective aspirations of all three nations.


Romania: electoral chaos and digital manipulation


Romania’s recent elections delivered a shocking result when Calin Georgescu, a relatively unknown far-right candidate with pro-Russian views, won the first round of the presidential race. Georgescu, previously linked to the nationalist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), campaigned on promises to halt support for Ukraine, dismissing it as a fictitious state manipulated by American military companies. His open admiration for Vladimir Putin and alignment with the influential Orthodox Church gained him significant traction.


Much of Georgescu’s campaign success was attributed to his strategic use of TikTok, where his messaging resonated with younger voters. However, just days before the second round of voting, Romania’s Constitutional Court invalidated the first-round results, citing evidence from the Supreme Council of Defense. The evidence revealed that Georgescu’s campaign was heavily manipulated by external forces.


In response, the European Commission launched formal proceedings against TikTok for failing to address systemic risks to electoral integrity, particularly during Romania’s presidential elections. Meta was also implicated in hosting coordinated disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing the election outcome. Both platforms denied any negligence, but the investigation underscores the rising threat of foreign interference via social media.


As Russia continues to exploit democratic processes in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania, its strategy reflects a broader effort to weaken Ukraine and destabilize the European project. By leveraging propaganda, disinformation, and electoral manipulation, Moscow seeks to undermine the very foundations of democracy in Eastern Europe.


In early December, intelligence reports revealed that the servers of Romania’s Central Electoral Commission were targeted with 85,000 cyberattacks on the day of the first round of the presidential election. While the reports identified a “state actor” as the likely culprit, they stopped short of directly naming Russia. Moscow, as expected, denied any involvement.


Romanian MEP Siegfried Mureșan, Vice-President of the European People's Party in the European Parliament, took to the social media platform X to condemn the interference. “Russian interference knows no bounds,” he stated, linking it to the rise of an extremist and populist candidate in Romania’s second round of elections.


The “Isolation Belt”: A geostrategic lens


Looking beyond the individual contexts of Moldova, Georgia, and Romania, a broader pattern of Russian interference emerges. Moscow’s actions are aimed at undermining European integration, derailing formal EU accession for these nations, and disrupting the coordination of the Associated Trio.

Romania, in particular, plays a vital role as a key partner to Ukraine. Bucharest has provided substantial, albeit often understated, military support, facilitated Ukrainian agricultural exports through its territory, and hosted large influxes of Ukrainian refugees. Should pro-Russian forces gain power in Romania, questions arise about the country’s ongoing assistance to Kyiv.


Russia’s broader objective is clear: to encircle Ukraine with an “isolation belt” in Eastern Europe, weakening Kyiv's allies and severing its support networks.


Through election interference, Moscow seeks to erode trust in democratic institutions across Eastern Europe. These nations are then forced to defend democracy itself — an already monumental task made more difficult by the necessity of adhering to legal frameworks in response to authoritarian provocations. Once elections are disrupted and public trust in the process falters, restoring faith becomes an uphill battle.


The Kremlin’s endgame is to transform Eastern Europe into a “gray zone” of failed democratic transit. Russian propaganda positions democratization in the region as ineffective, urging a return to authoritarian governance as the only viable alternative.


Russia pursues its goals in Eastern Europe through a combination of tactics: outright territorial seizures accompanied by puppet regimes, leveraging local politicians as proxies, and hacking democratic processes to destabilize governance. By fostering electoral turbulence and institutional paralysis, Moscow aims to hack these democracies and distract Western allies from Ukraine’s defense. Swift recovery from electoral interference and the ability to repel further attacks are crucial not just for the stability of Moldova, Georgia, and Romania, but for the broader security architecture of Europe.

 

Article written by Lesia Bidochko, Deputy Head of Detector Media Research Center. Main page illustration credits: Natalia Lobach. Article and pictures first time published on the Detector Media web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.


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