The Baltic: A NATO Lake With Crocodiles

Is the Baltic now a NATO lake? Changing strategic geography, and the accession of Sweden and Finland to alliance membership might make it seem so, but the reality is more fraught.

NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea / Source U.S. Navy

Eight of the Baltic Sea states are now in NATO, and just one littoral country, Russia, is not. That might seem a mismatch of force — the so-called NATO lake — but appearances can be deceptive, and no one should underestimate the ability of Moscow’s military to bring a serious fight to the “flooded meadow” of the wider Baltic region.  

Russian land-based aircraft and missiles, medium and small combat ships, and Kilo-class submarines have the potential to seriously disrupt the flow of vital supplies to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland, nations hemmed in by the Baltic and the territory of Russia and its Belarusian ally.  

Sweden has now become the lynchpin of the northern NATO supply network through the vital port of Gothenburg, which lies at the junction of the Skagerrak and Kattegat straits, through which all shipping must pass between the Baltic and the North Sea.  

At the same time, Stockholm’s forces are moving from a strategy of stopping invaders at its border to a more expeditionary role in support of wider NATO requirements (Swedish troops are now stationed in Latvia, for example).  

But regardless of NATO’s new members creating a new strategic geography, there is no doubt that it will be a hard fight in the event of war with Russia. 

The Russian Baltic Fleet may be the smallest of Russia’s main fleets, but it boasts a number of new surface combatants, along with other warships, land-based aircraft and missiles, and significant mine-laying capacity. There are fewer Russian submarines in the Baltic than at any time in the recent past, but as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine showed, Moscow can quickly reinforce any of its fleets if needed.  

The Baltic region is also a joint battle space with relatively short weapon ranges that would allow rapid Russian action if its missile systems fully live up to expectations.  

The Russian line of navigation through the Baltic to St. Petersburg, currently served by a shadow fleet of tankers avoiding sanctions on oil and gas exports, is as important to Moscow as allied resupply is to NATO, and the Russians would certainly fight to defend it.  

The Kremlin is already engaged in a hybrid/gray zone conflict in the Baltic, and the combined allied navies of Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and the Baltic states would be fully occupied in achieving and sustaining sea control in the Baltic in the event of war.  

The real difference between the Cold War and the present situation in the Baltic Sea is that NATO needs to preserve resupply to the isolated Baltic states and Finland. These states possess limited naval forces, leaving Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Poland to substantially shoulder the burden of sea control across the region.  

NATO Task Force Baltic, established in the German port of Rostock in late 2024, can serve as the umbrella headquarters for this effort, but it will take significant ship contributions to attain and maintain sea control. Germany has multiple air defense frigates, as do Norway and Denmark, but these might also be committed to other NATO missions outside the Baltic.  

Sweden is growing its fleet, with four new air defense frigates and three A-26 submarines, to help satisfy the sea control mission. Denmark’s navy is also expanding, as is Poland’s.  

Baltic nations have long confronted Soviet and now Russian threats, but the shift to a sea control objective is revolutionary for new NATO members such as Sweden, which has historically pursued a sea denial mission in the Baltic region.  

The seismic nature of the change is underscored by the fact that Sweden is now operating combat units in Europe outside its national borders for the first time since the Napoleonic wars (other than UN peacekeeping force contributions.) And protection of sea, rail, and road routes from Gothenburg to the east will be essential for the maintenance of NATO’s Nordic flank against potential Russian aggression. 

The level of commitment of both Sweden and Finland, as well as that of the Baltic states to their self-defense, highlights a common fear among many Europeans that Russia’s next target, once its war on Ukraine has ended, could be the Baltic region.  

Russian naval, air, and missile power, in both the Kaliningrad oblast and closer to St Petersburg, could massively disrupt NATO efforts to resupply its front lines in the Baltic states and Finland.  

Continued naval expansion by Sweden, Finland, Norway, Germany, Denmark, and Poland will therefore be vital to ensuring the Baltic sustains the potential to become a “NATO lake” if Russia attempts forceful action against alliance member states.  

One should never assume NATO dominance based on geography alone. The Baltic remains a contested space, and NATO must be ready to attain and sustain sea control in the region to ensure the successful resupply of its Nordic flank.  

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By Dr. Steven Wills. Steven Wills currently serves as a navalist for the Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy League of the US. He is an expert in US Navy strategy and policy. Wills had a 20-year career as an active-duty US Navy officer at sea and on shore-based assignments to the Defense Intelligence Agency and NATO.  Article and pictures first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.