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The Man With Viktor Orbán in His Sights

  • Writer: Res Publica
    Res Publica
  • 1 day ago
  • 5 min read

Hungary’s premier has held the role in a vise-like grip for 15 years, but faces the most serious challenge yet at next-year’s election.


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Péter Magyar / Péter Magyar Facebook page


If you had asked someone in Budapest or somewhere in the magyar puszta, the Great Hungarian Plain, who Péter Magyar was in early 2024, you would have been met with raised eyebrows. Magyar who?  


Only a few, very well-informed people would have told you that he was a jurist with some well-paid, state-affiliated jobs, and was the ex-husband of Katalin Varga, former Minister of Justice and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s right hand. 


If you had asked the same just a few days after the infamous presidential pardon scandal, which led to the resignation of Varga and the President of Hungary, Katalin Novák, in February that year, more people would have associated him with anti-government protests centered on child protection, profound corruption, and general dissatisfaction with Orbán’s government. 


Fast forward to the European Parliamentary elections in June 2024. Magyar had become not only a household name but also the challenger to Orbán’s 15-year-long reign. A newcomer to politics, whose name literally translates to “Peter (the) Hungarian”, he cemented himself as the most prominent opposition leader, and one who actually has a real shot at replacing Orbán’s illiberal government. 


Since last year, Magyar has not merely secured himself a place as a contender in Hungarian politics; he has succeeded in turning it upside down. His popularity has been steadily growing, and it is not limited to urban regions, unlike the traditional opposition parties. For the first time in more than a decade, Orbán must respond to internal political developments seriously, as Magyar has managed to seize the narrative from Orbán’s mostly compliant media and run with it. 


Magyar, now 44, and his Respect and Freedom Party, usually referred to as Tisza, after “the most Hungarian river”, as locals like to call it, are building on rising dissatisfaction with the shenanigans of 62 year-old Orbán’s wealthier-than-ever inner circle, and the disappointing economic situation (Hungary is now the most corrupt and second-poorest in the 27-member EU). 


Magyar focuses on everyday issues that concern Hungarians. Since the pandemic, there has been a lack of economic progress, while the prime minister, his family, and business associates have grown richer. While Orbán and company enjoy a lavish lifestyle with Birkin bags, real estate with exotic animal,s and luxurious trips abroad, the healthcare, education and social systems are on the brink of collapse nationwide, as Magyar habitually points out


But the removal of Orbán remains a huge task; the illiberal premier will not go quietly and remains a formidable opponent. The next election is expected to be held in April next year. Current opinion polls are eye-opening — Magyar’s party is leading Orbán’s Fidesz by 45% to 37%. That’s an earthquake by Hungarian standards and is Fidesz’s lowest rating in more than a decade. 


Even so, previous opposition attempts to unseat Orbán have failed. Earlier elections, in 2018 and 2022, saw opposition parties either running alone or as a coalition, but the main opposition never achieved more than 34% of the vote, while in 2022, Fidesz won 54%.  


What might the ruling party’s response be to the prospect or reality of defeat? Some hope that change might come from within the circles around Orbán. Others worry that the party would fight to retain power regardless of the popular verdict. The Russian intelligence service is already preparing the ground with allegations that the EU is working for “regime change” at the election. 


The state’s greatest weapon, aggressive smear campaigns directed at Magyar, have become part of everyday Hungarian life. Attempts to discredit his character have included teary-eyed interviews with his former wife accusing him of domestic violence (without investigation), secret audio recordings by his former girlfriend, and public mockery over him adjusting his trousers before his first-ever face-to-face encounter with Orbán in the European Parliament. None of this will come as a surprise to Magyar; his former wife, Varga will have given him a good sense of how the prime minister fights his battles.

  

Politically, Magyar has been associated with left-wing opposition figures, accused of being a puppet of European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and labeled “the Hungarian Zelenskyy” for his alleged pro-Ukraine stance. He is blamed by pro-government media for a range of supposed evils, including the freezing of €19bn ($22bn) in EU funds, failing hospitals, and delayed trains. 


The smear campaigns have failed. The only AIM for Fidesz OF these fearmongering narratives IS TO solidify its core voting base, roughly 2.5 million Hungarians. And yet that is the primary audience Magyar seeks to win over. 


In a quest to capture die-hard or disillusioned Orbán supporters, Magyar has gone on several road trips across Hungary, visiting small towns and poverty-stricken villages as well as Hungarian communities in neighboring countries — something Orbán and allies have done only rarely and for curated “supporters only” meetings. 


Magyar knows well that the outcome of the elections will be sealed by small-town residents and the undecided. Against the odds given Hungary’s urban-rural divide, he enjoys popularity in the countryside, something that fellow opposition politicians have always struggled with. His town hall-style public meetings allow his messages to reach the ears of Fidesz voters. He is a good speaker, energetic, and fairly young and athletic, a contrast to the older Orbán. 


Regardless of his likability, Magyar must walk a fine political line. To attract (disappointed) Fidesz supporters, he has maintained key elements of Orbán’s policies, including rejection of migration, a cautious stance on the war in Ukraine and that country’s EU accession, and on certain ideological issues. Failure to do so would bring immediate damnation from a hostile media.  


The election, now only eight months away, will be a fearsome test. While it may be free, it will not be fair. The election law is tailored to favor Fidesz (or the largest party), a significant portion of the media is under state control, and the government does not shy away from throwing money at its target audiences in the form of social benefits and loans, even though the state treasury is almost, if not completely, empty.  


The coming months will see the most intense campaign period Hungary has ever witnessed, centering on the epic battle between Orbán and Magyar. The challenger has stamina and popularity, but the incumbent has the experience, ally-filled institutions, and countless money to create a highly uneven playing field. 


Whether Magyar can bring substantial change to the country is an open question, but he is without doubt better-placed to topple Orban than any other political leader in recent times.  

By Ferenc Németh. Ferenc Németh is a Ph.D. candidate at Corvinus University of Budapest. He has previously conducted research on the Western Balkans in Toronto and Skopje, worked as a research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, and interned at EULEX Kosovo. His areas of expertise include the Western Balkans, EU enlargement, and regional security. Ferenc was a Denton Fellow at CEPA in 2024. Article first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.


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