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Making Russia Pay for Hybrid Attacks

There is a range of actions the West can take to counter Russia‘s malign activities. With the problem worsening, they need to be swiftly considered and implemented.


Russia is stepping up hybrid warfare against the West and now aims to create “sustained mayhem” on European streets, according to one of the continent’s most senior counter-intelligence officers.


For too long, the response from democratic governments has been inadequate and sometimes barely amounts to tut-tutting. This must change. The West needs to create an arsenal of hybrid warfare weaponry sufficiently devastating to make Russian eyes water and deter future misbehavior. The same goes for other enemies using needle-prick tactics to assail democratic states.


It should go hand-in-hand with ongoing efforts to bolster resilience across vulnerable sectors, ensuring that responses are not only robust but sustainable. It is best explained as “If you do this, you’ll face significant consequences.” 


Suppose you live in a respectable neighbourhood, but you’ve got a troublesome antisocial neighbour who regularly harasses your family. You might begin by avoiding him and so come to terms with the problem. If that doesn’t work, you might ask an expert to give a lecture on “Why harassment is wrong” and explain the damage it does to everyone. Fine, but what if that fails? At this point, you start to collect evidence, gather a few neighbours, and issue an ultimatum to this troublesome person: Keep this up and you’ll face consequences.


Lithuania’s experience of hostile actions from Russia/USSR all through the Baltic annexation in the 1940s and then 1990s up to the supposedly benign Yeltsin era shows that if left unchallenged, Russia sees no point in changing its behaviour. 


The Kremlin’s hybrid actions are now surging, moving from the aggressive to the sometimes lethal: cyber-attacks, social media manipulation shaping public perceptions on sensitive issues, such as immigration or support to Ukraine, and blending “classical” hybrid threats with more direct, kinetic sabotage methods. 


Experts are now calling for change. To achieve this, the West must shift from the outdated 1990s perspective of viewing Russia as a nuisance to embracing a full-scale counter-Russia stance.


What principles can we apply? 


First, clear communication. It’s vital to signal the resolve and the capability to retaliate. Strategic ambiguity can also be applied to keep Russia uncertain about the precise nature of the response. 


Second, solidarity among international partners amplifies the impact of any response, distributing the burden and presenting a united stance against hybrid aggression. 


Finally, credible deterrence is built through decisive responses to hybrid threats. Inaction or a lack of resolve undermines deterrence from the outset, as failing to impose costs can inadvertently encourage further aggression.


Some deterrence-by-punishment measures against Russia are already on the way: US, NATO, and the EU attribution of Russia’s misbehavior (naming and shaming) based on intelligence sharing; diplomatic actions such as expelling Russian spies from embassies; cyber offence rather than defence; restricting Russia’s influence in strategic sectors and diminishing economic leverage; fortifying the NATO presence in Eastern Europe, and ramping up support for Ukraine.


We face a creative adversary and should be creative in response. In the same way that Ukrainians brought war back to Russia (drones attacking targets in Russia), we also should make Russia bear the consequences of its extensive malign activities.


  • Information sharing (“naming and shaming”):

    • Encourage governments and civil society to more actively gather credible evidence and share it openly with both the public and international partners.

    • Encourage NATO and the EU to proactively share internal information about vulnerabilities.

    • Enhance collaboration among Western intelligence agencies and global partners to improve monitoring of potential smuggling routes and sanctions evasion. 

  • Economic and financial measures:

    • Target Russian decision-makers, their enablers, oligarchs, and entities with economic and property sanctions.

    • Provide financial rewards or relief from sanctions for Russians who break with Russian regime state policies.

    • Target Russian investments in major real estate markets such as London and Cyprus. 

    • Address Russia’s use of a “shadow fleet” or proxies that bypass oil and gas sanctions. 

  • Legal measures:

    • File indictments and pursue legal action against hostile individuals involved in hybrid actions.

  • Cyber:

    • Dismantle Russian-controlled or state-backed hacker groups’ botnets and disable servers involved in cyberattacks.

    • Establish a robust framework for lawful access to encrypted data — while respecting fundamental rights — to support law enforcement and security authorities in NATO and EU states.

  • Media:

    • Expose and disrupt disinformation campaigns through media platforms — both social and traditional. Publicly identify and remove accounts or networks that spread false information.

    • Undermine the influence of Russian state-sponsored media operating out of NATO and EU countries. Impose secondary sanctions on entities providing logistical or financial support to these media outlets. 

    • Assist Western media platforms in countering Russian propaganda.

    • Shape public sentiment, and promote democratic values in Russia. Employ independent media platforms, supporting Russian dissidents and civil society movements, promoting Russian exile and independent journalists, and leveraging social media and digital campaigns.

    • Combat Russian historical revisionism with factual narratives. 

  • Counter-sabotage:

    • Encourage NATO to counter sabotage operations and covert military actions with snap military exercises, increased troop deployments in vulnerable areas, port visits, and enhanced air and maritime patrols.

    • Establish an anti-sabotage network to support member states in preventing and responding to incidents.

    • Update NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense to counter threats from drones or other flying objects.

    • Employ countermeasures and signal-protection technologies in response to the jamming of civilian and military communications, GPS, and broadcasts.

    • Threaten to disrupt Russian logistical pathways.

    • Support member states facing instrumentalized migration.

  • Other measures:

    • Integrate both NATO’s military capabilities and the EU’s regulatory, economic, and diplomatic tools in a single framework.

    • Bolster Russia’s neighbours against hybrid threats by enhancing resilience, response, and intelligence-sharing capabilities.

    • Encourage NATO and the EU to establish and regularly update the list of Russia’s vulnerabilities and those involved in malign activities.

 

By Eitvydas Bajarūnas. Eitvydas Bajarūnas is an ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, and currently a Center for Europe Policy Analysis (CEPA) Visiting Fellow. Article and pictures first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.

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