NATO Should Stay In Europe — And Out of the Pacific

The alliance’s credibility rests on a strong deterrent on its home continent, not with ventures on the other side of the world.

US and NATO aircraft fly in formation above the Baltic Sea, in support of an exercise / U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Mario Coto

Fighting on multiple fronts simultaneously is a mistake, as Europe well knows. Napoleon lost his throne because his armies were spread thin from Madrid to Moscow. In two world wars, Germany thought it could win simultaneous campaigns in the East and West, and ended up being squeezed into defeat.

So why is NATO talking about going into Asia? Doesn’t the alliance have enough to do in Europe as it confronts a belligerent Russia?

Frustrated by Chinese and North Korean aid that is sustaining Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO leaders appear to be seriously considering getting the alliance involved in the Pacific region. “It shows you that we cannot think that there is one theater, which is the Euro-Atlantic theatre,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said in a June 9 speech at Chatham House, a British think tank. “Yes, of course, that’s the main theater we are focusing on. But we have to be conscious of the fact that this is all interconnected with what is happening in the Pacific.”

Naturally, that idea was immediately denounced by China. “Countries in the Asia-Pacific do not welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the region, and the region certainly does not need an Asia-Pacific NATO,” a Chinese government spokesman said. (In fact, such ideas are being discussed, but as an Asia-Pacific-only grouping).

Some of China’s neighbors would welcome NATO involvement. Taiwan would be ecstatic to have alliance support. So might the Philippines, which is embroiled in a territorial dispute over islands that has seen Chinese ships ramming Philippine vessels. What happens in Asia does affect NATO economies, including everything from trade, commodity prices, and the availability of goods from cell phones to children’s toys.

No doubt there would be satisfaction in spiting China. If Russia’s war economy is funded by selling oil to China, and Russia’s war machine is sustained by Chinese components and increasingly by Chinese experts, then why shouldn’t NATO retaliate with weapons and security guarantees for Taiwan?

The problem is that after decades of post-Cold War cuts in military spending, NATO can barely fight on one front, let alone two. Russia is far less powerful than China economically, and except for nuclear weapons, militarily. Yet it’s not even clear that NATO could stop a Russian invasion of the Baltic states, Poland or Finland. NATO amies are understrength, and munitions are in short supply or are being diverted to Ukraine. For example, with just 73,000 soldiers, the current British Army is the smallest it has been since the Napoleonic Wars.

A Pacific conflict — say, over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan — would primarily be a naval and air war (as Japan and the US discovered, fighting a land war in Asia is not recommended). Thus, any NATO contribution to Pacific security would mostly be ships, aircraft, and missiles.

With more than 22,000 military aircraft — including more than 3,000 fighters — and 1,100 warships of various types, NATO possesses a formidable amount of sea and air power. However, barring radical change in Russian policy, NATO would have to retain the bulk of these forces in Europe. 

Nor would all of this equipment be suitable for the Pacific. For example, Europe has numerous small warships — missile boats, corvettes, diesel subs — better suited for coastal warfare than the vast expanses of the Pacific. Far easier would be deploying an array of highly capable fighters — Typhoons, Rafales, Gripens, F-16s and now F-35s — to Asia. But those jets would require aerial tankers and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities that are mostly provided by the US, which likely will need them to support its own forces as well as Asian allies such as Japan.

Just finding adequate bases for a NATO expeditionary force — and sustaining with appropriate munitions and spare parts — would be difficult enough. But there is little sense in sending — or threatening to send — ships and planes that aren’t even operational. Germany’s armed forces have grappled with readiness issues: in 2018, just a handful of Luftwaffe jets were fully functional. Some advanced Royal Navy destroyers have spent more time being serviced than at sea. NATO armed forces lack sufficient stockpiles of artillery ammunition and guided missiles, and none are really prepared for the masses of drones that China would likely use.

And what would be the purpose of NATO expanding into the Pacific? The alliance has more than enough problems defending its doorstep, whether protecting the Baltic states from Russian invasion or convincing Russia to end its war of aggression against Ukraine. The thought of Taiwan or the Philippines joining the alliance — and receiving Article 5 defense guarantees — boggles the mind.

For NATO to play a meaningful role in Asian security, the alliance must be credible. This requires more than military power. There must also be the perception that Europe has the political will to use force in a region more than 5,000 miles away, and is willing to endure the economic pain of a war with China. Entanglement in Asia could also split NATO: America’s interests in the Pacific may not always align with Europe’s.

The real question isn’t whether NATO can exert power in Asia. The issue is where best the alliance can focus its limited resources. NATO was originally formed to keep the Soviets out of Western Europe, and while NATO did support US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in a less-contested era, there is good reason why the alliance has centered on the European region for 75 years.  

The biggest contribution that NATO could make to Asian security is to restrain Russia. If Putin is victorious in Ukraine, this will only reinforce the perception that the West is weak and embolden China and other nations to take advantage.

For NATO, charity begins at home.

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By Michael  Peck. Michael  Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Business Insider, Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Article and pictures first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.