Since the outbreak of all-out war in Ukraine, debate has raged in the US on whether the Russian and Chinese threats can be separated. They can’t.
There have been repeated attempts to disaggregate the two authoritarian regimes and the risks they pose to US and allied security. Some have argued that there is little tying them together and that China and Russia constitute distinct threats.
According to this line of reasoning, the war in Ukraine is a distraction from the long-term systemic challenge posed to the US by Beijing. Consequently, Washington should privilege the Pacific over the European Theater and channel its efforts toward increasing the US deterrent in the region.
In practical terms, this means husbanding resources that could help to degrade an invading Chinese force in Taiwan, to include deploying naval capabilities to break a blockade of Taiwan and using long-range strike weapons to defend the island.
Others maintain that the two theaters are inextricably linked, especially considering China and Russia’s close political alignment and post-2022 “no-limits” partnership, and the warm personal relationship between Xi Jinping and Putin.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently came down firmly on this side, stating that: “The deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is a threat to both Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security”, a clear indication that the alliance implicitly recognizes that Europe vs. Asia is not an either-or proposition.
The combat deployment of 10,000 North Korean troops to the battlefield near Ukraine’s border has confirmed that Russia’s war of aggression is now a multi-theater global confrontation — China’s critical role in sustaining Putin’s war machine through the supply of dual-use goods, as well as drone and missile technology, and Iran’s provision of ballistic missiles and other armaments to Russia, make it hard to argue against the de facto existence of a four nation authoritarian axis. These developments should put paid to the notion that the theaters can be neatly separated.
Pyongyang’s active engagement in the conflict, in particular, is a turning point. Not only does the transfer of North Korean military personnel to Russia represent a major escalation, it also marks yet another failure of US deterrence.
Whether in Ukraine, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, or the South China Sea, Moscow and Beijing seem increasingly keen to test US responses to their escalation. The deployment of troops to Eastern Europe by one of Moscow’s allies from Asia creates a precedent that defies residual assumptions from the Cold War era.
At no time during the Cold War were America’s communist adversaries willing to move kinetically against allied defenses in the European theater. Today this rule of engagement seems to no longer hold, for Moscow has shown no hesitation in bringing its junior partners into the fray.
There is another potentially transformative (and more positive) aspect of the North Korean deployment, namely that it may galvanize South Korea to decisively shore up Ukraine’s defenses amid concerns that the North Korean military could gain valuable combat experience in the war, and/or that Russia could transfer sophisticated military technology to Pyongyang as payoff for its assistance.
Thus far South Korea has been reluctant to provide weapons and munitions to Ukraine, assisting Kyiv only indirectly by replenishing its stockpile of the 155mm shells that the Biden administration then sent onto Ukraine. However, Kim Jong Un’s decision may change its calculus.
South Korea is a major weapons manufacturer, especially of modern main battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and missile launchers. At a time when Western munitions production is struggling to keep pace with demand, a decision by Seoul to open its factories to Ukrainian orders would represent a significant infusion of equipment and munitions to Kyiv.
With media reports now suggesting the North Koreans will be sent into combat against Ukrainian forces shortly, the capture of the first North Korean PoW will have political consequences that could further escalate the confrontation between NATO and Russia, and that would without a doubt escalate tensions in the Korean Peninsula.
Historians may point to the deployment of North Korean military personnel as a structural systemic transformation, the consequences of which could echo for decades. The use of North Koreans in Eastern Europe signals that our legacy assumptions that Asian powers would not dare to enter the Atlantic theater directly no longer apply.
By bringing Pyongyang into the fight, Moscow has dropped all pretense that it is concerned about horizontal escalation. Most importantly, the entry of the North Korean military into the war has the potential to redefine the balance of power in Europe, not so much in terms of the admittedly limited capabilities of the deployed troops, but in terms of European geopolitics. This decision is tantamount to the entry of a rising Asian power into the Euro-Atlantic space.
Pyongyang’s decision redefines a confrontation over the international order that pits the US and its allies against the Russo-Chinese led axis of anti-Western powers. With each passing month as the war rages on, Russia becomes more dependent on China’s backing to continue the campaign, giving it ever-more influence with Moscow to shape the outcome.
Taking matters one step further, it would mark a sea change for European security and transatlantic relations if, one day, China brokered a conflict-termination agreement, in the process becoming a key player in the European security system.
Should that occur, Xi would not only be bidding for regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, but also asserting himself as an international power broker, one with the growing ability to shape the European continent’s security.
Chels Michta is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Chels is a former CEPA Title VIII Fellow and is currently a military intelligence officer serving in the US Army.
The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
By Chels Michta. Chels Michta is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Chels is a former CEPA Title VIII Fellow and is currently a military intelligence officer serving in the US Army. Article and pictures first time published on CEPA web page. Prepared for publication by volunteers from the Res Publica - The Center for Civil Resistance.
